Information Asymmetry in Queues with Strategic Customers
Fuente:
arXiv
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| Hauptverfasser: | , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Veröffentlicht: |
2025
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| _version_ | 1866915546213122048 |
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| author | Zheng, Shunan Hasenbein, John |
| author_facet | Zheng, Shunan Hasenbein, John |
| contents | This paper studies information asymmetry in an unobservable single-server queueing system. While system managers have knowledge of the true arrival rate, customers may lack this information and instead form arbitrary beliefs. We propose a three-tier hierarchy of information asymmetry with increasing levels of information disclosure:customers keep private beliefs, customers are aware of the beliefs of others, and customers know the true arrival rate. Within this framework, the effects of the belief distribution, which is assumed to be general with minimal restrictions, are analyzed in terms of equilibrium joining probabilities, revenue, and social welfare. Furthermore,strategies for information disclosure are proposed for system managers to regulate the queue. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2510_09899 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Information Asymmetry in Queues with Strategic Customers Zheng, Shunan Hasenbein, John Optimization and Control This paper studies information asymmetry in an unobservable single-server queueing system. While system managers have knowledge of the true arrival rate, customers may lack this information and instead form arbitrary beliefs. We propose a three-tier hierarchy of information asymmetry with increasing levels of information disclosure:customers keep private beliefs, customers are aware of the beliefs of others, and customers know the true arrival rate. Within this framework, the effects of the belief distribution, which is assumed to be general with minimal restrictions, are analyzed in terms of equilibrium joining probabilities, revenue, and social welfare. Furthermore,strategies for information disclosure are proposed for system managers to regulate the queue. |
| title | Information Asymmetry in Queues with Strategic Customers |
| topic | Optimization and Control |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2510.09899 |