Predicting Module-Lattice Reduction

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Main Authors: Ducas, Léo, Engelberts, Lynn, de Perthuis, Paola
Format: Preprint
Published: 2025
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author Ducas, Léo
Engelberts, Lynn
de Perthuis, Paola
author_facet Ducas, Léo
Engelberts, Lynn
de Perthuis, Paola
contents Is module-lattice reduction better than unstructured lattice reduction? This question was highlighted as 'Q8' in the Kyber NIST standardization submission (Avanzi et al., 2021), as potentially affecting the concrete security of Kyber and other module-lattice-based schemes. Foundational works on module-lattice reduction (Lee, Pellet-Mary, Stehlé, and Wallet, ASIACRYPT 2019; Mukherjee and Stephens-Davidowitz, CRYPTO 2020) confirmed the existence of such module variants of LLL and block-reduction algorithms, but focus only on provable worst-case asymptotic behavior. In this work, we present a concrete average-case analysis of module-lattice reduction. Specifically, we address the question of the expected slope after running module-BKZ, and pinpoint the discriminant $Δ_K$ of the number field at hand as the main quantity driving this slope. We convert this back into a gain or loss on the blocksize $β$: module-BKZ in a number field $K$ of degree $d$ requires an SVP oracle of dimension $β+ \log(|Δ_K| / d^d)β/(d\log β) + o(β/ \log β)$ to reach the same slope as unstructured BKZ with blocksize $β$. This asymptotic summary hides further terms that we predict concretely using experimentally verified heuristics. Incidentally, we provide the first open-source implementation of module-BKZ for some cyclotomic fields. For power-of-two cyclotomic fields, we have $|Δ_K| = d^d$, and conclude that module-BKZ requires a blocksize larger than its unstructured counterpart by $d-1+o(1)$. On the contrary, for all other cyclotomic fields we have $|Δ_K| < d^d$, so module-BKZ provides a sublinear $Θ(β/\log β)$ gain on the required blocksize, yielding a subexponential speedup of $\exp(Θ(β/\log β))$.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2510_10540
institution arXiv
publishDate 2025
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Predicting Module-Lattice Reduction
Ducas, Léo
Engelberts, Lynn
de Perthuis, Paola
Cryptography and Security
Is module-lattice reduction better than unstructured lattice reduction? This question was highlighted as 'Q8' in the Kyber NIST standardization submission (Avanzi et al., 2021), as potentially affecting the concrete security of Kyber and other module-lattice-based schemes. Foundational works on module-lattice reduction (Lee, Pellet-Mary, Stehlé, and Wallet, ASIACRYPT 2019; Mukherjee and Stephens-Davidowitz, CRYPTO 2020) confirmed the existence of such module variants of LLL and block-reduction algorithms, but focus only on provable worst-case asymptotic behavior. In this work, we present a concrete average-case analysis of module-lattice reduction. Specifically, we address the question of the expected slope after running module-BKZ, and pinpoint the discriminant $Δ_K$ of the number field at hand as the main quantity driving this slope. We convert this back into a gain or loss on the blocksize $β$: module-BKZ in a number field $K$ of degree $d$ requires an SVP oracle of dimension $β+ \log(|Δ_K| / d^d)β/(d\log β) + o(β/ \log β)$ to reach the same slope as unstructured BKZ with blocksize $β$. This asymptotic summary hides further terms that we predict concretely using experimentally verified heuristics. Incidentally, we provide the first open-source implementation of module-BKZ for some cyclotomic fields. For power-of-two cyclotomic fields, we have $|Δ_K| = d^d$, and conclude that module-BKZ requires a blocksize larger than its unstructured counterpart by $d-1+o(1)$. On the contrary, for all other cyclotomic fields we have $|Δ_K| < d^d$, so module-BKZ provides a sublinear $Θ(β/\log β)$ gain on the required blocksize, yielding a subexponential speedup of $\exp(Θ(β/\log β))$.
title Predicting Module-Lattice Reduction
topic Cryptography and Security
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2510.10540