Collaborative Shadows: Distributed Backdoor Attacks in LLM-Based Multi-Agent Systems

Fuente: arXiv
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Autores principales: Zhu, Pengyu, Li, Lijun, Lyu, Yaxing, Sun, Li, Su, Sen, Shao, Jing
Formato: Preprint
Publicado: 2025
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author Zhu, Pengyu
Li, Lijun
Lyu, Yaxing
Sun, Li
Su, Sen
Shao, Jing
author_facet Zhu, Pengyu
Li, Lijun
Lyu, Yaxing
Sun, Li
Su, Sen
Shao, Jing
contents LLM-based multi-agent systems (MAS) demonstrate increasing integration into next-generation applications, but their safety in backdoor attacks remains largely underexplored. However, existing research has focused exclusively on single-agent backdoor attacks, overlooking the novel attack surfaces introduced by agent collaboration in MAS. To bridge this gap, we present the first Distributed Backdoor Attack tailored to MAS. We decompose the backdoor into multiple distributed attack primitives that are embedded within MAS tools. These primitives remain dormant individually but collectively activate only when agents collaborate in a specific sequence, thereby assembling the full backdoor to execute targeted attacks such as data exfiltration. To fully assess this threat, we introduce a benchmark for multi-role collaborative tasks and a sandboxed framework to evaluate. Extensive experiments demonstrate that our attack achieves an attack success rate exceeding 95% without degrading performance on benign tasks. This work exposes novel backdoor attack surfaces that exploit agent collaboration, underscoring the need to move beyond single-agent protection. Code and benchmark are available at https://github.com/whfeLingYu/Distributed-Backdoor-Attacks-in-MAS.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2510_11246
institution arXiv
publishDate 2025
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Collaborative Shadows: Distributed Backdoor Attacks in LLM-Based Multi-Agent Systems
Zhu, Pengyu
Li, Lijun
Lyu, Yaxing
Sun, Li
Su, Sen
Shao, Jing
Cryptography and Security
LLM-based multi-agent systems (MAS) demonstrate increasing integration into next-generation applications, but their safety in backdoor attacks remains largely underexplored. However, existing research has focused exclusively on single-agent backdoor attacks, overlooking the novel attack surfaces introduced by agent collaboration in MAS. To bridge this gap, we present the first Distributed Backdoor Attack tailored to MAS. We decompose the backdoor into multiple distributed attack primitives that are embedded within MAS tools. These primitives remain dormant individually but collectively activate only when agents collaborate in a specific sequence, thereby assembling the full backdoor to execute targeted attacks such as data exfiltration. To fully assess this threat, we introduce a benchmark for multi-role collaborative tasks and a sandboxed framework to evaluate. Extensive experiments demonstrate that our attack achieves an attack success rate exceeding 95% without degrading performance on benign tasks. This work exposes novel backdoor attack surfaces that exploit agent collaboration, underscoring the need to move beyond single-agent protection. Code and benchmark are available at https://github.com/whfeLingYu/Distributed-Backdoor-Attacks-in-MAS.
title Collaborative Shadows: Distributed Backdoor Attacks in LLM-Based Multi-Agent Systems
topic Cryptography and Security
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2510.11246