French on London and Bauer, and QBism

Fuente: arXiv
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Autore principale: Pienaar, Jacques L.
Natura: Preprint
Pubblicazione: 2025
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author Pienaar, Jacques L.
author_facet Pienaar, Jacques L.
contents In this article I compare two interpretations of quantum mechanics (QM) that draw inspiration from phenomenology: the London-Bauer-French interpretation (hereafter LBF) as articulated by Steven French, and QBism. I give special attention to certain disagreements between QBism and LBF identified French's work, as well as French's related claims that QBism may be at odds with key ideas in phenomenology. My main finding is that QBism does not fare so badly with phenomenology as French makes out; in particular it can be made compatible with Zahavi's correlationism and Husserl's notion of intersubjectivity, both of which strongly inform LBF. Nevertheless, I concur with French's argument that QBism is incompatible with the conception of quantum measurement in LBF, hence also with that of Merleau-Ponty, as the latter based his own analysis on that of London and Bauer. I explain why I find QBism's account preferable in this case.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2510_11544
institution arXiv
publishDate 2025
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle French on London and Bauer, and QBism
Pienaar, Jacques L.
Quantum Physics
History and Philosophy of Physics
In this article I compare two interpretations of quantum mechanics (QM) that draw inspiration from phenomenology: the London-Bauer-French interpretation (hereafter LBF) as articulated by Steven French, and QBism. I give special attention to certain disagreements between QBism and LBF identified French's work, as well as French's related claims that QBism may be at odds with key ideas in phenomenology. My main finding is that QBism does not fare so badly with phenomenology as French makes out; in particular it can be made compatible with Zahavi's correlationism and Husserl's notion of intersubjectivity, both of which strongly inform LBF. Nevertheless, I concur with French's argument that QBism is incompatible with the conception of quantum measurement in LBF, hence also with that of Merleau-Ponty, as the latter based his own analysis on that of London and Bauer. I explain why I find QBism's account preferable in this case.
title French on London and Bauer, and QBism
topic Quantum Physics
History and Philosophy of Physics
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2510.11544