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| Autori principali: | , , , |
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| Natura: | Preprint |
| Pubblicazione: |
2025
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| Soggetti: | |
| Accesso online: | https://arxiv.org/abs/2510.11848 |
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| _version_ | 1866911208590802944 |
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| author | Reppas, Efstratios Wadi, Ali Gould, Brendan Vamvoudakis, Kyriakos G. |
| author_facet | Reppas, Efstratios Wadi, Ali Gould, Brendan Vamvoudakis, Kyriakos G. |
| contents | In this paper, we develop a framework for deception in quantum games, extending the Honey-X paradigm from classical zero-sum settings into the quantum domain. Building on a view of deception in classical games as manipulation of a player's perception of the payoff matrix, we formalize quantum deception as controlled perturbations of the payoff Hamiltonian subject to a deception budget. We show that when victims are aware of possible deception, their equilibrium strategies surprisingly coincide with those of naive victims who fully trust the deceptive Hamiltonian. This equivalence allows us to cast quantum deception as a bilevel optimization problem, which can be reformulated into a bilinear semidefinite program. To illustrate the framework, we present simulations on quantum versions of the Penny Flip game, demonstrating how quantum strategy spaces and non-classical payoffs can amplify the impact of deception relative to classical formulations. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2510_11848 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Quantum Deception: Honey-X Deception using Quantum Games Reppas, Efstratios Wadi, Ali Gould, Brendan Vamvoudakis, Kyriakos G. Systems and Control In this paper, we develop a framework for deception in quantum games, extending the Honey-X paradigm from classical zero-sum settings into the quantum domain. Building on a view of deception in classical games as manipulation of a player's perception of the payoff matrix, we formalize quantum deception as controlled perturbations of the payoff Hamiltonian subject to a deception budget. We show that when victims are aware of possible deception, their equilibrium strategies surprisingly coincide with those of naive victims who fully trust the deceptive Hamiltonian. This equivalence allows us to cast quantum deception as a bilevel optimization problem, which can be reformulated into a bilinear semidefinite program. To illustrate the framework, we present simulations on quantum versions of the Penny Flip game, demonstrating how quantum strategy spaces and non-classical payoffs can amplify the impact of deception relative to classical formulations. |
| title | Quantum Deception: Honey-X Deception using Quantum Games |
| topic | Systems and Control |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2510.11848 |