Saved in:
| Main Author: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Preprint |
| Published: |
2025
|
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://arxiv.org/abs/2510.14185 |
| Tags: |
Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
|
| _version_ | 1866914096185606144 |
|---|---|
| author | Vanlyssel, Jack |
| author_facet | Vanlyssel, Jack |
| contents | Industrial Control Systems (ICS) underpin the United States' critical infrastructure, managing essential services such as power, water, and transportation that are vital to national security and public safety. However, increasing digital integration has exposed these systems to escalating cyber threats. Historical attacks like Stuxnet and the Ukraine power grid incident revealed exploitable weaknesses-poor network segmentation, outdated software, weak authentication, and inadequate monitoring-that persist in many U.S. ICS environments today. This paper analyzes these landmark attacks to identify recurring vulnerabilities and assess their relevance to current U.S. infrastructure. It argues that without immediate reforms, similar exploits could lead to catastrophic disruptions and national security crises. To address these risks, the paper proposes policy measures focused on implementing zero-trust architecture and improved network segmentation to enhance system resilience. These recommendations aim to guide policymakers and industry leaders in securing the nation's most critical operational technologies against future cyber threats. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2510_14185 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Securing U.S. Critical Infrastructure: Lessons from Stuxnet and the Ukraine Power Grid Attacks Vanlyssel, Jack Cryptography and Security Industrial Control Systems (ICS) underpin the United States' critical infrastructure, managing essential services such as power, water, and transportation that are vital to national security and public safety. However, increasing digital integration has exposed these systems to escalating cyber threats. Historical attacks like Stuxnet and the Ukraine power grid incident revealed exploitable weaknesses-poor network segmentation, outdated software, weak authentication, and inadequate monitoring-that persist in many U.S. ICS environments today. This paper analyzes these landmark attacks to identify recurring vulnerabilities and assess their relevance to current U.S. infrastructure. It argues that without immediate reforms, similar exploits could lead to catastrophic disruptions and national security crises. To address these risks, the paper proposes policy measures focused on implementing zero-trust architecture and improved network segmentation to enhance system resilience. These recommendations aim to guide policymakers and industry leaders in securing the nation's most critical operational technologies against future cyber threats. |
| title | Securing U.S. Critical Infrastructure: Lessons from Stuxnet and the Ukraine Power Grid Attacks |
| topic | Cryptography and Security |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2510.14185 |