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| Main Authors: | , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Published: |
2025
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://arxiv.org/abs/2510.14589 |
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| _version_ | 1866915565188153344 |
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| author | Sundararajan, Vaishnavi Rithwik |
| author_facet | Sundararajan, Vaishnavi Rithwik |
| contents | Tracking devices, while designed to help users find their belongings in case of loss/theft, bring in new questions about privacy and surveillance of not just their own users, but in the case of crowd-sourced location tracking, even that of others even orthogonally associated with these platforms. Apple's Find My is perhaps the most ubiquitous such system which can even locate devices which do not possess any cellular support or GPS, running on millions of devices worldwide. Apple claims that this system is private and secure, but the code is proprietary, and such claims have to be taken on faith. It is well known that even with perfect cryptographic guarantees, logical flaws might creep into protocols, and allow undesirable attacks. In this paper, we present a symbolic model of the Find My protocol, as well as a precise formal specification of desirable properties, and provide automated, machine-checkable proofs of these properties in the Tamarin prover. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2510_14589 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Symbolic verification of Apple's Find My location-tracking protocol Sundararajan, Vaishnavi Rithwik Cryptography and Security Tracking devices, while designed to help users find their belongings in case of loss/theft, bring in new questions about privacy and surveillance of not just their own users, but in the case of crowd-sourced location tracking, even that of others even orthogonally associated with these platforms. Apple's Find My is perhaps the most ubiquitous such system which can even locate devices which do not possess any cellular support or GPS, running on millions of devices worldwide. Apple claims that this system is private and secure, but the code is proprietary, and such claims have to be taken on faith. It is well known that even with perfect cryptographic guarantees, logical flaws might creep into protocols, and allow undesirable attacks. In this paper, we present a symbolic model of the Find My protocol, as well as a precise formal specification of desirable properties, and provide automated, machine-checkable proofs of these properties in the Tamarin prover. |
| title | Symbolic verification of Apple's Find My location-tracking protocol |
| topic | Cryptography and Security |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2510.14589 |