The Bidding Games: Reinforcement Learning for MEV Extraction on Polygon Blockchain

Fuente: arXiv
Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Seoev, Andrei, Gremyachikh, Leonid, Smirnova, Anastasiia, Madhwal, Yash, Kalacheva, Alisa, Belousov, Dmitry, Zubov, Ilia, Smirnov, Aleksei, Fedyanin, Denis, Gorgadze, Vladimir, Yanovich, Yury
Format: Preprint
Published: 2025
Subjects:
Online Access:
Tags: Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
_version_ 1866917018848985088
author Seoev, Andrei
Gremyachikh, Leonid
Smirnova, Anastasiia
Madhwal, Yash
Kalacheva, Alisa
Belousov, Dmitry
Zubov, Ilia
Smirnov, Aleksei
Fedyanin, Denis
Gorgadze, Vladimir
Yanovich, Yury
author_facet Seoev, Andrei
Gremyachikh, Leonid
Smirnova, Anastasiia
Madhwal, Yash
Kalacheva, Alisa
Belousov, Dmitry
Zubov, Ilia
Smirnov, Aleksei
Fedyanin, Denis
Gorgadze, Vladimir
Yanovich, Yury
contents In blockchain networks, the strategic ordering of transactions within blocks has emerged as a significant source of profit extraction, known as Maximal Extractable Value (MEV). The transition from spam-based Priority Gas Auctions to structured auction mechanisms like Polygon Atlas has transformed MEV extraction from public bidding wars into sealed-bid competitions under extreme time constraints. While this shift reduces network congestion, it introduces complex strategic challenges where searchers must make optimal bidding decisions within a sub-second window without knowledge of competitor behavior or presence. Traditional game-theoretic approaches struggle in this high-frequency, partially observable environment due to their reliance on complete information and static equilibrium assumptions. We present a reinforcement learning framework for MEV extraction on Polygon Atlas and make three contributions: (1) A novel simulation environment that accurately models the stochastic arrival of arbitrage opportunities and probabilistic competition in Atlas auctions; (2) A PPO-based bidding agent optimized for real-time constraints, capable of adaptive strategy formulation in continuous action spaces while maintaining production-ready inference speeds; (3) Empirical validation demonstrating our history-conditioned agent captures 49\% of available profits when deployed alongside existing searchers and 81\% when replacing the market leader, significantly outperforming static bidding strategies. Our work establishes that reinforcement learning provides a critical advantage in high-frequency MEV environments where traditional optimization methods fail, offering immediate value for industrial participants and protocol designers alike.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2510_14642
institution arXiv
publishDate 2025
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle The Bidding Games: Reinforcement Learning for MEV Extraction on Polygon Blockchain
Seoev, Andrei
Gremyachikh, Leonid
Smirnova, Anastasiia
Madhwal, Yash
Kalacheva, Alisa
Belousov, Dmitry
Zubov, Ilia
Smirnov, Aleksei
Fedyanin, Denis
Gorgadze, Vladimir
Yanovich, Yury
Computer Science and Game Theory
Artificial Intelligence
Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing
In blockchain networks, the strategic ordering of transactions within blocks has emerged as a significant source of profit extraction, known as Maximal Extractable Value (MEV). The transition from spam-based Priority Gas Auctions to structured auction mechanisms like Polygon Atlas has transformed MEV extraction from public bidding wars into sealed-bid competitions under extreme time constraints. While this shift reduces network congestion, it introduces complex strategic challenges where searchers must make optimal bidding decisions within a sub-second window without knowledge of competitor behavior or presence. Traditional game-theoretic approaches struggle in this high-frequency, partially observable environment due to their reliance on complete information and static equilibrium assumptions. We present a reinforcement learning framework for MEV extraction on Polygon Atlas and make three contributions: (1) A novel simulation environment that accurately models the stochastic arrival of arbitrage opportunities and probabilistic competition in Atlas auctions; (2) A PPO-based bidding agent optimized for real-time constraints, capable of adaptive strategy formulation in continuous action spaces while maintaining production-ready inference speeds; (3) Empirical validation demonstrating our history-conditioned agent captures 49\% of available profits when deployed alongside existing searchers and 81\% when replacing the market leader, significantly outperforming static bidding strategies. Our work establishes that reinforcement learning provides a critical advantage in high-frequency MEV environments where traditional optimization methods fail, offering immediate value for industrial participants and protocol designers alike.
title The Bidding Games: Reinforcement Learning for MEV Extraction on Polygon Blockchain
topic Computer Science and Game Theory
Artificial Intelligence
Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2510.14642