Physical Layer Deception as a Stackelberg Game: Strategy Regimes, Equilibrium, and Robust Design
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arXiv
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| Format: | Preprint |
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2025
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| _version_ | 1866915946633887744 |
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| author | Chen, Wenwen Han, Bin Zhu, Yao Schmeink, Anke Caire, Giuseppe Schotten, Hans D. |
| author_facet | Chen, Wenwen Han, Bin Zhu, Yao Schmeink, Anke Caire, Giuseppe Schotten, Hans D. |
| contents | Physical layer deception (PLD) combines physical layer security (PLS) with deception: the transmitter actively misleads the eavesdropper with falsified information. We model the transmitter-eavesdropper interaction as a Stackelberg game in which the transmitter commits to a resource allocation and encryption strategy, and each receiver best-responds by selecting among three decryption modes: Perception, Dropping, and Exclusion. Using semantic distortion as the metric, we derive closed-form switching surfaces that partition the parameter space into strategy regimes and identify conditions under which each regime dominates. The robust operating point, at the peak of the worst-case distortion envelope, is shown to be a Stackelberg equilibrium; iterative best-response dynamics oscillate around it with strictly lower time-averaged security. We evaluate the design under Nakagami-m fading with static and adaptive transmitter strategies, benchmarked against a classical PLS baseline. Numerical results validate the regime characterization and show 12-55% higher eavesdropper distortion than the erasure-only baseline across all fading conditions. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2510_15063 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Physical Layer Deception as a Stackelberg Game: Strategy Regimes, Equilibrium, and Robust Design Chen, Wenwen Han, Bin Zhu, Yao Schmeink, Anke Caire, Giuseppe Schotten, Hans D. Cryptography and Security Information Theory Physical layer deception (PLD) combines physical layer security (PLS) with deception: the transmitter actively misleads the eavesdropper with falsified information. We model the transmitter-eavesdropper interaction as a Stackelberg game in which the transmitter commits to a resource allocation and encryption strategy, and each receiver best-responds by selecting among three decryption modes: Perception, Dropping, and Exclusion. Using semantic distortion as the metric, we derive closed-form switching surfaces that partition the parameter space into strategy regimes and identify conditions under which each regime dominates. The robust operating point, at the peak of the worst-case distortion envelope, is shown to be a Stackelberg equilibrium; iterative best-response dynamics oscillate around it with strictly lower time-averaged security. We evaluate the design under Nakagami-m fading with static and adaptive transmitter strategies, benchmarked against a classical PLS baseline. Numerical results validate the regime characterization and show 12-55% higher eavesdropper distortion than the erasure-only baseline across all fading conditions. |
| title | Physical Layer Deception as a Stackelberg Game: Strategy Regimes, Equilibrium, and Robust Design |
| topic | Cryptography and Security Information Theory |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2510.15063 |