Saved in:
| Main Authors: | , , , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Preprint |
| Published: |
2025
|
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://arxiv.org/abs/2510.15384 |
| Tags: |
Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
|
| _version_ | 1866910217796583424 |
|---|---|
| author | Sakr, Amal Araldo, Andrea Chahed, Tijani Kofman, Daniel |
| author_facet | Sakr, Amal Araldo, Andrea Chahed, Tijani Kofman, Daniel |
| contents | Mobile Edge Computing (MEC) requires Network Operators (NOs) to undertake substantial infrastructure investments, while most revenues are captured by Service Providers (SPs) offering end-user applications. This cost-revenue imbalance discourages NOs from investing in MEC deployment, despite increasing demand for low-latency and bandwidth-intensive services. This paper proposes a co-investment scheme in which players, i.e., one NO and multiple SPs, jointly deploy, maintain, and share MEC infrastructure over multiple decision epochs. We devise a new coalitional game model that captures the planning of resources, their allocation among players, and cost and revenue sharing. To address fluctuating user demand and evolving participation incentives, we design a mechanism that updates resources and allows the dynamic entrance and exit of players over time. We sustain cooperation through a compensation scheme. Numerical results show that combining resource updates with dynamic participation increases the total payoff and strengthens the NO's incentive to invest. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2510_15384 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Co-Investment in Mobile Edge Computing with Infrastructure Update and Dynamic Participation Sakr, Amal Araldo, Andrea Chahed, Tijani Kofman, Daniel Computer Science and Game Theory Mobile Edge Computing (MEC) requires Network Operators (NOs) to undertake substantial infrastructure investments, while most revenues are captured by Service Providers (SPs) offering end-user applications. This cost-revenue imbalance discourages NOs from investing in MEC deployment, despite increasing demand for low-latency and bandwidth-intensive services. This paper proposes a co-investment scheme in which players, i.e., one NO and multiple SPs, jointly deploy, maintain, and share MEC infrastructure over multiple decision epochs. We devise a new coalitional game model that captures the planning of resources, their allocation among players, and cost and revenue sharing. To address fluctuating user demand and evolving participation incentives, we design a mechanism that updates resources and allows the dynamic entrance and exit of players over time. We sustain cooperation through a compensation scheme. Numerical results show that combining resource updates with dynamic participation increases the total payoff and strengthens the NO's incentive to invest. |
| title | Co-Investment in Mobile Edge Computing with Infrastructure Update and Dynamic Participation |
| topic | Computer Science and Game Theory |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2510.15384 |