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| Main Authors: | , , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Published: |
2025
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://arxiv.org/abs/2510.15384 |
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Table of Contents:
- Mobile Edge Computing (MEC) requires Network Operators (NOs) to undertake substantial infrastructure investments, while most revenues are captured by Service Providers (SPs) offering end-user applications. This cost-revenue imbalance discourages NOs from investing in MEC deployment, despite increasing demand for low-latency and bandwidth-intensive services. This paper proposes a co-investment scheme in which players, i.e., one NO and multiple SPs, jointly deploy, maintain, and share MEC infrastructure over multiple decision epochs. We devise a new coalitional game model that captures the planning of resources, their allocation among players, and cost and revenue sharing. To address fluctuating user demand and evolving participation incentives, we design a mechanism that updates resources and allows the dynamic entrance and exit of players over time. We sustain cooperation through a compensation scheme. Numerical results show that combining resource updates with dynamic participation increases the total payoff and strengthens the NO's incentive to invest.