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Main Authors: Wang, Longwei, Uddin, Ifrat Ikhtear, Santosh, KC, Zhang, Chaowei, Qin, Xiao, Zhou, Yang
Format: Preprint
Published: 2025
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Online Access:https://arxiv.org/abs/2510.16171
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author Wang, Longwei
Uddin, Ifrat Ikhtear
Santosh, KC
Zhang, Chaowei
Qin, Xiao
Zhou, Yang
author_facet Wang, Longwei
Uddin, Ifrat Ikhtear
Santosh, KC
Zhang, Chaowei
Qin, Xiao
Zhou, Yang
contents Adversarial examples reveal critical vulnerabilities in deep neural networks by exploiting their sensitivity to imperceptible input perturbations. While adversarial training remains the predominant defense strategy, it often incurs significant computational cost and may compromise clean-data accuracy. In this work, we investigate an architectural approach to adversarial robustness by embedding group-equivariant convolutions-specifically, rotation- and scale-equivariant layers-into standard convolutional neural networks (CNNs). These layers encode symmetry priors that align model behavior with structured transformations in the input space, promoting smoother decision boundaries and greater resilience to adversarial attacks. We propose and evaluate two symmetry-aware architectures: a parallel design that processes standard and equivariant features independently before fusion, and a cascaded design that applies equivariant operations sequentially. Theoretically, we demonstrate that such models reduce hypothesis space complexity, regularize gradients, and yield tighter certified robustness bounds under the CLEVER (Cross Lipschitz Extreme Value for nEtwork Robustness) framework. Empirically, our models consistently improve adversarial robustness and generalization across CIFAR-10, CIFAR-100, and CIFAR-10C under both FGSM and PGD attacks, without requiring adversarial training. These findings underscore the potential of symmetry-enforcing architectures as efficient and principled alternatives to data augmentation-based defenses.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2510_16171
institution arXiv
publishDate 2025
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Bridging Symmetry and Robustness: On the Role of Equivariance in Enhancing Adversarial Robustness
Wang, Longwei
Uddin, Ifrat Ikhtear
Santosh, KC
Zhang, Chaowei
Qin, Xiao
Zhou, Yang
Machine Learning
Artificial Intelligence
Adversarial examples reveal critical vulnerabilities in deep neural networks by exploiting their sensitivity to imperceptible input perturbations. While adversarial training remains the predominant defense strategy, it often incurs significant computational cost and may compromise clean-data accuracy. In this work, we investigate an architectural approach to adversarial robustness by embedding group-equivariant convolutions-specifically, rotation- and scale-equivariant layers-into standard convolutional neural networks (CNNs). These layers encode symmetry priors that align model behavior with structured transformations in the input space, promoting smoother decision boundaries and greater resilience to adversarial attacks. We propose and evaluate two symmetry-aware architectures: a parallel design that processes standard and equivariant features independently before fusion, and a cascaded design that applies equivariant operations sequentially. Theoretically, we demonstrate that such models reduce hypothesis space complexity, regularize gradients, and yield tighter certified robustness bounds under the CLEVER (Cross Lipschitz Extreme Value for nEtwork Robustness) framework. Empirically, our models consistently improve adversarial robustness and generalization across CIFAR-10, CIFAR-100, and CIFAR-10C under both FGSM and PGD attacks, without requiring adversarial training. These findings underscore the potential of symmetry-enforcing architectures as efficient and principled alternatives to data augmentation-based defenses.
title Bridging Symmetry and Robustness: On the Role of Equivariance in Enhancing Adversarial Robustness
topic Machine Learning
Artificial Intelligence
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2510.16171