C/N0 Analysis-Based GPS Spoofing Detection with Variable Antenna Orientations
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| Main Authors: | , , , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
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2025
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| _version_ | 1866914100939849728 |
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| author | Li, Vienna Villa, Justin Diessner, Dan Clifford, Jayson Kandel, Laxima Niure |
| author_facet | Li, Vienna Villa, Justin Diessner, Dan Clifford, Jayson Kandel, Laxima Niure |
| contents | GPS spoofing poses a growing threat to aviation by falsifying satellite signals and misleading aircraft navigation systems. This paper demonstrates a proof-of-concept spoofing detection strategy based on analyzing satellite Carrier-to-Noise Density Ratio (C/N$_0$) variation during controlled static antenna orientations. Using a u-blox EVK-M8U receiver and a GPSG-1000 satellite simulator, C/N$_0$ data is collected under three antenna orientations flat, banked right, and banked left) in both real-sky (non-spoofed) and spoofed environments. Our findings reveal that under non-spoofed signals, C/N$_0$ values fluctuate naturally with orientation, reflecting true geometric dependencies. However, spoofed signals demonstrate a distinct pattern: the flat orientation, which directly faces the spoofing antenna, consistently yielded the highest C/N$_0$ values, while both banked orientations showed reduced C/N$_0$ due to misalignment with the spoofing source. These findings suggest that simple maneuvers such as brief banking to induce C/N$_0$ variations can provide early cues of GPS spoofing for general aviation and UAV systems. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2510_16229 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | C/N0 Analysis-Based GPS Spoofing Detection with Variable Antenna Orientations Li, Vienna Villa, Justin Diessner, Dan Clifford, Jayson Kandel, Laxima Niure Cryptography and Security GPS spoofing poses a growing threat to aviation by falsifying satellite signals and misleading aircraft navigation systems. This paper demonstrates a proof-of-concept spoofing detection strategy based on analyzing satellite Carrier-to-Noise Density Ratio (C/N$_0$) variation during controlled static antenna orientations. Using a u-blox EVK-M8U receiver and a GPSG-1000 satellite simulator, C/N$_0$ data is collected under three antenna orientations flat, banked right, and banked left) in both real-sky (non-spoofed) and spoofed environments. Our findings reveal that under non-spoofed signals, C/N$_0$ values fluctuate naturally with orientation, reflecting true geometric dependencies. However, spoofed signals demonstrate a distinct pattern: the flat orientation, which directly faces the spoofing antenna, consistently yielded the highest C/N$_0$ values, while both banked orientations showed reduced C/N$_0$ due to misalignment with the spoofing source. These findings suggest that simple maneuvers such as brief banking to induce C/N$_0$ variations can provide early cues of GPS spoofing for general aviation and UAV systems. |
| title | C/N0 Analysis-Based GPS Spoofing Detection with Variable Antenna Orientations |
| topic | Cryptography and Security |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2510.16229 |