A First Look at the Security Issues in the Model Context Protocol Ecosystem
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arXiv
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Published: |
2025
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| _version_ | 1866910171198914560 |
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| author | Li, Xiaofan Gao, Xing |
| author_facet | Li, Xiaofan Gao, Xing |
| contents | The Model Context Protocol (MCP) has emerged as a standard for connecting large language models (LLMs) with external tools. However, this MCP ecosystem introduces new security risks across hosts, servers, and registries. In this paper, we present the first cross-entity security study of MCP under a two-stage attack surface. At the registry-level, weak vetting and ownership checks allow adversarial or hijacked servers to enter hosts. After integration, attacker-controlled tool metadata can shape LLM reasoning and induce attacker-intended operations, which hosts execute without independent verification. Code-level vulnerabilities (e.g., code injection) are not required but can amplify attacker-controlled parameters into exploitation. We analyze 67,057 servers across six public registries and identify widespread conditions enabling server hijacking and invocation manipulation. We further implement MCPInspect, a pre-integration analysis tool that detects misleading tool metadata and exploitable code vulnerabilities, identifying 833 vulnerable servers and 18 with suspicious descriptions. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2510_16558 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | A First Look at the Security Issues in the Model Context Protocol Ecosystem Li, Xiaofan Gao, Xing Cryptography and Security Artificial Intelligence The Model Context Protocol (MCP) has emerged as a standard for connecting large language models (LLMs) with external tools. However, this MCP ecosystem introduces new security risks across hosts, servers, and registries. In this paper, we present the first cross-entity security study of MCP under a two-stage attack surface. At the registry-level, weak vetting and ownership checks allow adversarial or hijacked servers to enter hosts. After integration, attacker-controlled tool metadata can shape LLM reasoning and induce attacker-intended operations, which hosts execute without independent verification. Code-level vulnerabilities (e.g., code injection) are not required but can amplify attacker-controlled parameters into exploitation. We analyze 67,057 servers across six public registries and identify widespread conditions enabling server hijacking and invocation manipulation. We further implement MCPInspect, a pre-integration analysis tool that detects misleading tool metadata and exploitable code vulnerabilities, identifying 833 vulnerable servers and 18 with suspicious descriptions. |
| title | A First Look at the Security Issues in the Model Context Protocol Ecosystem |
| topic | Cryptography and Security Artificial Intelligence |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2510.16558 |