Addendum: Systematic Evaluation of Randomized Cache Designs against Cache Occupancy
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| Main Authors: | , , , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
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2025
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| _version_ | 1866917026795094016 |
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| author | Chakraborty, Anirban Mishra, Nimish Saha, Sayandeep Bhattacharya, Sarani Mukhopadhyay, Debdeep |
| author_facet | Chakraborty, Anirban Mishra, Nimish Saha, Sayandeep Bhattacharya, Sarani Mukhopadhyay, Debdeep |
| contents | In the main text published at USENIX Security 2025, we presented a systematic analysis of the role of cache occupancy in the design considerations for randomized caches (from the perspectives of performance and security). On the performance front, we presented a uniform benchmarking strategy that allows for a fair comparison among different randomized cache designs. Likewise, from the security perspective, we presented three threat assumptions: (1) covert channels; (2) process fingerprinting side-channel; and (3) AES key recovery. The main takeaway of our work is an open problem of designing a randomized cache of comparable efficiency with modern set-associative LLCs, while still resisting both contention-based and occupancy-based attacks. This note is meant as an addendum to the main text in light of the observations made in [2]. To summarize, the authors in [2] argue that (1) L1d cache size plays a role in adversarial success, and that (2) a patched version of MIRAGE with randomized initial seeding of global eviction map prevents leakage of AES key. We discuss the same in this addendum. |
| format | Preprint |
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arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2510_16871 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Addendum: Systematic Evaluation of Randomized Cache Designs against Cache Occupancy Chakraborty, Anirban Mishra, Nimish Saha, Sayandeep Bhattacharya, Sarani Mukhopadhyay, Debdeep Cryptography and Security In the main text published at USENIX Security 2025, we presented a systematic analysis of the role of cache occupancy in the design considerations for randomized caches (from the perspectives of performance and security). On the performance front, we presented a uniform benchmarking strategy that allows for a fair comparison among different randomized cache designs. Likewise, from the security perspective, we presented three threat assumptions: (1) covert channels; (2) process fingerprinting side-channel; and (3) AES key recovery. The main takeaway of our work is an open problem of designing a randomized cache of comparable efficiency with modern set-associative LLCs, while still resisting both contention-based and occupancy-based attacks. This note is meant as an addendum to the main text in light of the observations made in [2]. To summarize, the authors in [2] argue that (1) L1d cache size plays a role in adversarial success, and that (2) a patched version of MIRAGE with randomized initial seeding of global eviction map prevents leakage of AES key. We discuss the same in this addendum. |
| title | Addendum: Systematic Evaluation of Randomized Cache Designs against Cache Occupancy |
| topic | Cryptography and Security |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2510.16871 |