Preference Measurement Error, Concentration in Recommendation Systems, and Persuasion
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arXiv
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Published: |
2025
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| _version_ | 1866914103417634816 |
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| author | Haupt, Andreas |
| author_facet | Haupt, Andreas |
| contents | Algorithmic recommendation based on noisy preference measurement is prevalent in recommendation systems. This paper discusses the consequences of such recommendation on market concentration and inequality. Binary types denoting a statistical majority and minority are noisily revealed through a statistical experiment. The achievable utilities and recommendation shares for the two groups can be analyzed as a Bayesian Persuasion problem. While under arbitrary noise structures, effects on concentration compared to a full-information market are ambiguous, under symmetric noise, concentration increases and consumer welfare becomes more unequal. We define symmetric statistical experiments and analyze persuasion under a restriction to such experiments, which may be of independent interest. |
| format | Preprint |
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arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2510_16972 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Preference Measurement Error, Concentration in Recommendation Systems, and Persuasion Haupt, Andreas Theoretical Economics Computers and Society Algorithmic recommendation based on noisy preference measurement is prevalent in recommendation systems. This paper discusses the consequences of such recommendation on market concentration and inequality. Binary types denoting a statistical majority and minority are noisily revealed through a statistical experiment. The achievable utilities and recommendation shares for the two groups can be analyzed as a Bayesian Persuasion problem. While under arbitrary noise structures, effects on concentration compared to a full-information market are ambiguous, under symmetric noise, concentration increases and consumer welfare becomes more unequal. We define symmetric statistical experiments and analyze persuasion under a restriction to such experiments, which may be of independent interest. |
| title | Preference Measurement Error, Concentration in Recommendation Systems, and Persuasion |
| topic | Theoretical Economics Computers and Society |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2510.16972 |