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| Main Authors: | , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Published: |
2025
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://arxiv.org/abs/2510.17006 |
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| _version_ | 1866909857000456192 |
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| author | Kaneko, Masahiro Talat, Zeerak Baldwin, Timothy |
| author_facet | Kaneko, Masahiro Talat, Zeerak Baldwin, Timothy |
| contents | Iterative jailbreak methods that repeatedly rewrite and input prompts into large language models (LLMs) to induce harmful outputs -- using the model's previous responses to guide each new iteration -- have been found to be a highly effective attack strategy. Despite being an effective attack strategy against LLMs and their safety mechanisms, existing defenses do not proactively disrupt this dynamic trial-and-error cycle. In this study, we propose a novel framework that dynamically updates its defense strategy through online learning in response to each new prompt from iterative jailbreak methods. Leveraging the distinctions between harmful jailbreak-generated prompts and typical harmless prompts, we introduce a reinforcement learning-based approach that optimizes prompts to ensure appropriate responses for harmless tasks while explicitly rejecting harmful prompts. Additionally, to curb overfitting to the narrow band of partial input rewrites explored during an attack, we introduce Past-Direction Gradient Damping (PDGD). Experiments conducted on three LLMs show that our approach significantly outperforms five existing defense methods against five iterative jailbreak methods. Moreover, our results indicate that our prompt optimization strategy simultaneously enhances response quality for harmless tasks. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2510_17006 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Online Learning Defense against Iterative Jailbreak Attacks via Prompt Optimization Kaneko, Masahiro Talat, Zeerak Baldwin, Timothy Computation and Language Iterative jailbreak methods that repeatedly rewrite and input prompts into large language models (LLMs) to induce harmful outputs -- using the model's previous responses to guide each new iteration -- have been found to be a highly effective attack strategy. Despite being an effective attack strategy against LLMs and their safety mechanisms, existing defenses do not proactively disrupt this dynamic trial-and-error cycle. In this study, we propose a novel framework that dynamically updates its defense strategy through online learning in response to each new prompt from iterative jailbreak methods. Leveraging the distinctions between harmful jailbreak-generated prompts and typical harmless prompts, we introduce a reinforcement learning-based approach that optimizes prompts to ensure appropriate responses for harmless tasks while explicitly rejecting harmful prompts. Additionally, to curb overfitting to the narrow band of partial input rewrites explored during an attack, we introduce Past-Direction Gradient Damping (PDGD). Experiments conducted on three LLMs show that our approach significantly outperforms five existing defense methods against five iterative jailbreak methods. Moreover, our results indicate that our prompt optimization strategy simultaneously enhances response quality for harmless tasks. |
| title | Online Learning Defense against Iterative Jailbreak Attacks via Prompt Optimization |
| topic | Computation and Language |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2510.17006 |