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Eliciting Truthful Feedback for Preference-Based Learning via the VCG Mechanism

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors:	Landolt, Leo, Maddux, Anna, Schlaginhaufen, Andreas, Vaishampayan, Saurabh, Kamgarpour, Maryam
Format:	Preprint
Published:	2025
Subjects:	Computer Science and Game Theory
Online Access:	Acceder al recurso
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