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Autori principali: Haddad, Osama Al, Ikram, Muhammad, Ahmed, Ejaz, Lee, Young
Natura: Preprint
Pubblicazione: 2025
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Accesso online:https://arxiv.org/abs/2510.18508
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author Haddad, Osama Al
Ikram, Muhammad
Ahmed, Ejaz
Lee, Young
author_facet Haddad, Osama Al
Ikram, Muhammad
Ahmed, Ejaz
Lee, Young
contents Security analysts face increasing pressure to triage large and complex vulnerability backlogs. Large Language Models (LLMs) offer a potential aid by automating parts of the interpretation process. We evaluate four models (ChatGPT, Claude, Gemini, and DeepSeek) across twelve prompting techniques to interpret semi-structured and unstructured vulnerability information. As a concrete use case, we test each model's ability to predict decision points in the Stakeholder-Specific Vulnerability Categorization (SSVC) framework: Exploitation, Automatable, Technical Impact, and Mission and Wellbeing. Using 384 real-world vulnerabilities from the VulZoo dataset, we issued more than 165,000 queries to assess performance under prompting styles including one-shot, few-shot, and chain-of-thought. We report F1 scores for each SSVC decision point and Cohen's kappa (weighted and unweighted) for the final SSVC decision outcomes. Gemini consistently ranked highest, leading on three of four decision points and yielding the most correct recommendations. Prompting with exemplars generally improved accuracy, although all models struggled on some decision points. Only DeepSeek achieved fair agreement under weighted metrics, and all models tended to over-predict risk. Overall, current LLMs do not replace expert judgment. However, specific LLM and prompt combinations show moderate effectiveness for targeted SSVC decisions. When applied with care, LLMs can support vulnerability prioritization workflows and help security teams respond more efficiently to emerging threats.
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institution arXiv
publishDate 2025
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Prompting the Priorities: A First Look at Evaluating LLMs for Vulnerability Triage and Prioritization
Haddad, Osama Al
Ikram, Muhammad
Ahmed, Ejaz
Lee, Young
Cryptography and Security
Security analysts face increasing pressure to triage large and complex vulnerability backlogs. Large Language Models (LLMs) offer a potential aid by automating parts of the interpretation process. We evaluate four models (ChatGPT, Claude, Gemini, and DeepSeek) across twelve prompting techniques to interpret semi-structured and unstructured vulnerability information. As a concrete use case, we test each model's ability to predict decision points in the Stakeholder-Specific Vulnerability Categorization (SSVC) framework: Exploitation, Automatable, Technical Impact, and Mission and Wellbeing. Using 384 real-world vulnerabilities from the VulZoo dataset, we issued more than 165,000 queries to assess performance under prompting styles including one-shot, few-shot, and chain-of-thought. We report F1 scores for each SSVC decision point and Cohen's kappa (weighted and unweighted) for the final SSVC decision outcomes. Gemini consistently ranked highest, leading on three of four decision points and yielding the most correct recommendations. Prompting with exemplars generally improved accuracy, although all models struggled on some decision points. Only DeepSeek achieved fair agreement under weighted metrics, and all models tended to over-predict risk. Overall, current LLMs do not replace expert judgment. However, specific LLM and prompt combinations show moderate effectiveness for targeted SSVC decisions. When applied with care, LLMs can support vulnerability prioritization workflows and help security teams respond more efficiently to emerging threats.
title Prompting the Priorities: A First Look at Evaluating LLMs for Vulnerability Triage and Prioritization
topic Cryptography and Security
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2510.18508