Teacher transfers: equalizing deficits across schools
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arXiv
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| Main Authors: | , , , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
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2025
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| _version_ | 1866914117518884864 |
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| author | Mishra, Debasis Sarkar, Soumendu Sen, Arunava Sethuraman, Jay Yadav, Sonal |
| author_facet | Mishra, Debasis Sarkar, Soumendu Sen, Arunava Sethuraman, Jay Yadav, Sonal |
| contents | The Right to Free and Compulsory Education Act (2009) (RTE) of the Government of India prescribes student-teacher ratios for state-run schools. One method advocated by the Act to achieve its goals is the redeployment of teachers from surplus to deficit (in teacher strength) schools. We consider a model where teachers can either remain in their initially assigned schools or be transferred to a deficit school in their acceptable set. The planner's objective is specified in terms of the post-transfer deficit vector that can be achieved. We show that there exists a transfer whose post-transfer deficit vector Lorenz dominates all achievable post-transfer deficit vectors. We provide a two-stage algorithm to derive the Lorenz-dominant post-transfer deficit vector, and show that this algorithm is strategy-proof for teachers. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2510_18708 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Teacher transfers: equalizing deficits across schools Mishra, Debasis Sarkar, Soumendu Sen, Arunava Sethuraman, Jay Yadav, Sonal Theoretical Economics The Right to Free and Compulsory Education Act (2009) (RTE) of the Government of India prescribes student-teacher ratios for state-run schools. One method advocated by the Act to achieve its goals is the redeployment of teachers from surplus to deficit (in teacher strength) schools. We consider a model where teachers can either remain in their initially assigned schools or be transferred to a deficit school in their acceptable set. The planner's objective is specified in terms of the post-transfer deficit vector that can be achieved. We show that there exists a transfer whose post-transfer deficit vector Lorenz dominates all achievable post-transfer deficit vectors. We provide a two-stage algorithm to derive the Lorenz-dominant post-transfer deficit vector, and show that this algorithm is strategy-proof for teachers. |
| title | Teacher transfers: equalizing deficits across schools |
| topic | Theoretical Economics |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2510.18708 |