Knowledge and Common Knowledge of Strategies

Fuente: arXiv
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Main Authors: Miranda, Borja Sierra, Studer, Thomas
Format: Preprint
Published: 2025
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author Miranda, Borja Sierra
Studer, Thomas
author_facet Miranda, Borja Sierra
Studer, Thomas
contents Most existing work on strategic reasoning simply adopts either an informed or an uninformed semantics. We propose a model where knowledge of strategies can be specified on a fine-grained level. In particular, it is possible to distinguish first-order, higher-order, and common knowledge of strategies. We illustrate the effect of higher-order knowledge of strategies by studying the game Hanabi. Further, we show that common knowledge of strategies is necessary to solve the consensus problem. Finally, we study the decidability of the model checking problem.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2510_19298
institution arXiv
publishDate 2025
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Knowledge and Common Knowledge of Strategies
Miranda, Borja Sierra
Studer, Thomas
Logic in Computer Science
Artificial Intelligence
Most existing work on strategic reasoning simply adopts either an informed or an uninformed semantics. We propose a model where knowledge of strategies can be specified on a fine-grained level. In particular, it is possible to distinguish first-order, higher-order, and common knowledge of strategies. We illustrate the effect of higher-order knowledge of strategies by studying the game Hanabi. Further, we show that common knowledge of strategies is necessary to solve the consensus problem. Finally, we study the decidability of the model checking problem.
title Knowledge and Common Knowledge of Strategies
topic Logic in Computer Science
Artificial Intelligence
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2510.19298