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| Hauptverfasser: | , , , , , , , , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Veröffentlicht: |
2025
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| Online-Zugang: | https://arxiv.org/abs/2510.20333 |
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| _version_ | 1866911485436887040 |
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| author | Chen, Chiyu Song, Xinhao Chai, Yunkai Yao, Yang Zhao, Haodong Li, Lijun Li, Jie Teng, Yan Liu, Gongshen Wang, Yingchun |
| author_facet | Chen, Chiyu Song, Xinhao Chai, Yunkai Yao, Yang Zhao, Haodong Li, Lijun Li, Jie Teng, Yan Liu, Gongshen Wang, Yingchun |
| contents | Vision-Language Models (VLMs) are increasingly deployed as autonomous agents to navigate mobile graphical user interfaces (GUIs). Operating in dynamic on-device ecosystems, which include notifications, pop-ups, and inter-app interactions, exposes them to a unique and underexplored threat vector: environmental injection. Unlike prompt-based attacks that manipulate textual instructions, environmental injection corrupts an agent's visual perception by inserting adversarial UI elements (for example, deceptive overlays or spoofed notifications) directly into the GUI. This bypasses textual safeguards and can derail execution, causing privacy leakage, financial loss, or irreversible device compromise. To systematically evaluate this threat, we introduce GhostEI-Bench, the first benchmark for assessing mobile agents under environmental injection attacks within dynamic, executable environments. Moving beyond static image-based assessments, GhostEI-Bench injects adversarial events into realistic application workflows inside fully operational Android emulators and evaluates performance across critical risk scenarios. We further propose a judge-LLM protocol that conducts fine-grained failure analysis by reviewing the agent's action trajectory alongside the corresponding screenshot sequence, pinpointing failure in perception, recognition, or reasoning. Comprehensive experiments on state-of-the-art agents reveal pronounced vulnerability to deceptive environmental cues: current models systematically fail to perceive and reason about manipulated UIs. GhostEI-Bench provides a framework for quantifying and mitigating this emerging threat, paving the way toward more robust and secure embodied agents. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2510_20333 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | GhostEI-Bench: Do Mobile Agents Resilience to Environmental Injection in Dynamic On-Device Environments? Chen, Chiyu Song, Xinhao Chai, Yunkai Yao, Yang Zhao, Haodong Li, Lijun Li, Jie Teng, Yan Liu, Gongshen Wang, Yingchun Cryptography and Security Artificial Intelligence Vision-Language Models (VLMs) are increasingly deployed as autonomous agents to navigate mobile graphical user interfaces (GUIs). Operating in dynamic on-device ecosystems, which include notifications, pop-ups, and inter-app interactions, exposes them to a unique and underexplored threat vector: environmental injection. Unlike prompt-based attacks that manipulate textual instructions, environmental injection corrupts an agent's visual perception by inserting adversarial UI elements (for example, deceptive overlays or spoofed notifications) directly into the GUI. This bypasses textual safeguards and can derail execution, causing privacy leakage, financial loss, or irreversible device compromise. To systematically evaluate this threat, we introduce GhostEI-Bench, the first benchmark for assessing mobile agents under environmental injection attacks within dynamic, executable environments. Moving beyond static image-based assessments, GhostEI-Bench injects adversarial events into realistic application workflows inside fully operational Android emulators and evaluates performance across critical risk scenarios. We further propose a judge-LLM protocol that conducts fine-grained failure analysis by reviewing the agent's action trajectory alongside the corresponding screenshot sequence, pinpointing failure in perception, recognition, or reasoning. Comprehensive experiments on state-of-the-art agents reveal pronounced vulnerability to deceptive environmental cues: current models systematically fail to perceive and reason about manipulated UIs. GhostEI-Bench provides a framework for quantifying and mitigating this emerging threat, paving the way toward more robust and secure embodied agents. |
| title | GhostEI-Bench: Do Mobile Agents Resilience to Environmental Injection in Dynamic On-Device Environments? |
| topic | Cryptography and Security Artificial Intelligence |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2510.20333 |