Cover Image

Strategic Costs of Perceived Bias in Fair Selection

Fuente: arXiv

Saved in:

Bibliographic Details
Main Authors:	Celis, L. Elisa, Huang, Lingxiao, Sohoni, Milind, Vishnoi, Nisheeth K.
Format:	Preprint
Published:	2025
Subjects:	Computer Science and Game Theory Computers and Society Machine Learning Theoretical Economics
Online Access:	Acceder al recurso
Tags:	Add Tag No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!

Similar Items

Delegation and Verification Under AI
by: Huang, Lingxiao, et al.
Published: (2026)

Matchings Under Biased and Correlated Evaluations
by: Kumar, Amit, et al.
Published: (2025)

Centralized Selection with Preferences in the Presence of Biases
by: Celis, L. Elisa, et al.
Published: (2024)

Multi-dimensional Test Design
by: Qiu, Xiaoyun, et al.
Published: (2025)

Revisiting Fairness Impossibility with Endogenous Behavior
by: Penn, Elizabeth Maggie, et al.
Published: (2026)

Fair Allocation in Dynamic Mechanism Design
by: Fallah, Alireza, et al.
Published: (2024)

From No-Regret to Strategically Robust Learning in Repeated Auctions
by: Zhao, Junyao
Published: (2026)

Path Dependence under Adaptive AI Delegation
by: Huang, Lingxiao, et al.
Published: (2026)

More Than Opinions: The Role of Values in Shaping Fairness and Status in the Ultimatum Game within Structured Societies
by: Krakovská, Hana, et al.
Published: (2025)

Response Time Enhances Alignment with Heterogeneous Preferences
by: Echenique, Federico, et al.
Published: (2026)

Strategic Bidding in Knapsack Auctions
by: Khezr, Peyman, et al.
Published: (2024)

Efficient Lower Bounding of Single Transferable Vote Election Margins
by: Blom, Michelle, et al.
Published: (2025)

Dynamic Matching Under Patience Imbalance
by: Chen, Zhiyuan, et al.
Published: (2026)

Inequality in the Age of Pseudonymity
by: Yaish, Aviv, et al.
Published: (2025)

Delegation in Strategic Environments and Equilibrium Uniqueness
by: Sandomirskiy, Fedor, et al.
Published: (2026)

Information Design with Elicitation and Strategic Coordination
by: Bonatti, Alessandro, et al.
Published: (2023)

Algorithmic Fairness and Social Welfare
by: Liang, Annie, et al.
Published: (2024)

On the Fairness of Additive Welfarist Rules
by: Celine, Karen Frilya, et al.
Published: (2024)

The Architecture of Illusion: Network Opacity and Strategic Escalation
by: Ebrahimi, Raman, et al.
Published: (2026)

Networked Information Aggregation via Machine Learning
by: Kearns, Michael, et al.
Published: (2025)

Multiplayer Bandit Learning, from Competition to Cooperation
by: Brânzei, Simina, et al.
Published: (2019)

The Bounds of Algorithmic Collusion; $Q$-learning, Gradient Learning, and the Folk Theorem
by: Askenazi-Golan, Galit, et al.
Published: (2024)

A Linear Theory of Multi-Winner Voting
by: Xia, Lirong
Published: (2025)

Welfare, Improvability, and Variance: A Principal-Agent Approach to Optimal Benchmark Item Aggregation
by: Haupt, Andreas, et al.
Published: (2026)

How Humans Help LLMs: Assessing and Incentivizing Human Preference Annotators
by: Liu, Shang, et al.
Published: (2025)

Persuading a Behavioral Agent: Approximately Best Responding and Learning
by: Chen, Yiling, et al.
Published: (2023)

Algorithmic Collusion Without Threats
by: Arunachaleswaran, Eshwar Ram, et al.
Published: (2024)

Exploration and Persuasion
by: Slivkins, Aleksandrs
Published: (2024)

Competing Bandits: The Perils of Exploration Under Competition
by: Aridor, Guy, et al.
Published: (2020)

Swim till You Sink: Computing the Limit of a Game
by: Hakim, Rashida, et al.
Published: (2024)

Learning to Coordinate Bidders in Non-Truthful Auctions
by: Fu, Hu, et al.
Published: (2025)

Emergent Alignment via Competition
by: Collina, Natalie, et al.
Published: (2025)

Online Assortment and Price Optimization Under Contextual Choice Models
by: Erginbas, Yigit Efe, et al.
Published: (2025)

Randomized Truthful Auctions with Learning Agents
by: Aggarwal, Gagan, et al.
Published: (2024)

Deep Learning for Double Auction
by: Liu, Jiayin, et al.
Published: (2025)

Networked Information Aggregation for Binary Classification
by: Bateni, MohammadHossein, et al.
Published: (2026)

Learning to Play Multi-Follower Bayesian Stackelberg Games
by: Personnat, Gerson, et al.
Published: (2025)

"Calibeating": Beating Forecasters at Their Own Game
by: Foster, Dean P., et al.
Published: (2022)

How to Sell High-Dimensional Data Optimally
by: Li, Andrew, et al.
Published: (2025)

Fair Division of Chores with Budget Constraints
by: Elkind, Edith, et al.
Published: (2024)