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Rationalizable Screening and Disclosure under Unawareness

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors:	Francetich, Alejandro, Schipper, Burkhard C.
Format:	Preprint
Published:	2025
Subjects:	Theoretical Economics Computer Science and Game Theory
Online Access:	Acceder al recurso
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