Tunable Asymmetric Delay Attack in Quantum Clock Synchronization
Fuente:
arXiv
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| Auteurs principaux: | , , , , , , , , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Publié: |
2025
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| _version_ | 1866909867243995136 |
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| author | Han, Hui Teng, Haotian Xu, Hailong Huang, Jinquan Xie, Yuanmei Zhang, Yichen Liu, Bo Yu, Wanrong Zhao, Baokang Chen, Shuhui |
| author_facet | Han, Hui Teng, Haotian Xu, Hailong Huang, Jinquan Xie, Yuanmei Zhang, Yichen Liu, Bo Yu, Wanrong Zhao, Baokang Chen, Shuhui |
| contents | Quantum clock synchronization underpins modern secure communications and critical infrastructure, yet its fundamental dependence on channel reciprocity introduces an exploitable vulnerability to asymmetric delay attacks. Current attack strategies rely on static delays, limiting their ability to target application-specific stability requirements. Here, we propose a tunable asymmetric delay attack (T-ADA) that dynamically controls delay parameters to induce manipulate synchronization accuracy. Through experimental implementation, we demonstrate how tailored attack trajectories can selectively compromise system stability across different scenarios. This work uncovers key vulnerabilities in synchronization protocols under customizable attacks and provide a foundation for developing secure and resilient quantum clock synchronization systems. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2510_21101 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Tunable Asymmetric Delay Attack in Quantum Clock Synchronization Han, Hui Teng, Haotian Xu, Hailong Huang, Jinquan Xie, Yuanmei Zhang, Yichen Liu, Bo Yu, Wanrong Zhao, Baokang Chen, Shuhui Quantum Physics Quantum clock synchronization underpins modern secure communications and critical infrastructure, yet its fundamental dependence on channel reciprocity introduces an exploitable vulnerability to asymmetric delay attacks. Current attack strategies rely on static delays, limiting their ability to target application-specific stability requirements. Here, we propose a tunable asymmetric delay attack (T-ADA) that dynamically controls delay parameters to induce manipulate synchronization accuracy. Through experimental implementation, we demonstrate how tailored attack trajectories can selectively compromise system stability across different scenarios. This work uncovers key vulnerabilities in synchronization protocols under customizable attacks and provide a foundation for developing secure and resilient quantum clock synchronization systems. |
| title | Tunable Asymmetric Delay Attack in Quantum Clock Synchronization |
| topic | Quantum Physics |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2510.21101 |