Scale-robust Auctions
Fuente:
arXiv
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| Main Authors: | , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Published: |
2025
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| Subjects: | |
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| _version_ | 1866917039436726272 |
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| author | Hartline, Jason Johnsen, Aleck Li, Yingkai |
| author_facet | Hartline, Jason Johnsen, Aleck Li, Yingkai |
| contents | We study auctions that are robust at any scale, i.e., they can be applied to sell both expensive and cheap items and achieve the best multiplicative approximations of the optimal revenue in the worst case. We show that the optimal mechanism is scale invariant, which randomizes between selling at the second-price and a 2.45 multiple of the second-price. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2510_21231 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Scale-robust Auctions Hartline, Jason Johnsen, Aleck Li, Yingkai Computer Science and Game Theory Theoretical Economics We study auctions that are robust at any scale, i.e., they can be applied to sell both expensive and cheap items and achieve the best multiplicative approximations of the optimal revenue in the worst case. We show that the optimal mechanism is scale invariant, which randomizes between selling at the second-price and a 2.45 multiple of the second-price. |
| title | Scale-robust Auctions |
| topic | Computer Science and Game Theory Theoretical Economics |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2510.21231 |