Imagen de Portada

Scale-robust Auctions

Fuente: arXiv

Guardado en:

Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores principales:	Hartline, Jason, Johnsen, Aleck, Li, Yingkai
Formato:	Preprint
Publicado:	2025
Materias:	Computer Science and Game Theory Theoretical Economics
Acceso en línea:	Acceder al recurso
Etiquetas:	Agregar Etiqueta Sin Etiquetas, Sea el primero en etiquetar este registro!

Ejemplares similares

Revenue Non-monotonicity in Matching Markets
por: Hartline, Jason
Publicado: (2026)

Clarification of `Algorithmic Collusion without Threats'
por: Hartline, Jason
Publicado: (2026)

Algorithmic Information Disclosure in Optimal Auctions
por: Cai, Yang, et al.
Publicado: (2024)

Combinatorial Pen Testing (or Consumer Surplus of Deferred-Acceptance Auctions)
por: Ganesh, Aadityan, et al.
Publicado: (2023)

A Geometric Analysis of Gains from Trade
por: Hartline, Jason, et al.
Publicado: (2025)

Competition Complexity in Multi-Item Auctions: Beyond VCG and Regularity
por: Beyhaghi, Hedyeh, et al.
Publicado: (2025)

The Economics of No-regret Learning Algorithms
por: Hartline, Jason
Publicado: (2026)

Regulation of Algorithmic Collusion, Refined: Testing Pessimistic Calibrated Regret
por: Hartline, Jason D., et al.
Publicado: (2025)

Regulation of Algorithmic Collusion
por: Hartline, Jason D., et al.
Publicado: (2024)

Three Tiers and Thresholds: Incentives in Private Market Investing
por: Keppo, Jussi, et al.
Publicado: (2025)

Anonymous Pricing in Large Markets
por: Jin, Yaonan, et al.
Publicado: (2026)

Mechanism Design under Costly Signaling: the Value of Non-Coordination
por: Li, Yingkai, et al.
Publicado: (2023)

Screening for Choice Sets
por: Gan, Tan, et al.
Publicado: (2026)

Dynamics and Contracts for an Agent with Misspecified Beliefs
por: Li, Yingkai, et al.
Publicado: (2024)

Learning and Communication Towards Unanimous Consent
por: Li, Yingkai, et al.
Publicado: (2024)

Exploration and Incentivizing Participation in Randomized Trials
por: Li, Yingkai, et al.
Publicado: (2022)

Incentivizing Forecasters to Learn: Summarized vs. Unrestricted Advice
por: Li, Yingkai, et al.
Publicado: (2023)

Rank-Guaranteed Auctions
por: He, Wei, et al.
Publicado: (2024)

Going Public: Communication in Collective Decisions
por: Du, Zhicheng, et al.
Publicado: (2026)

Managing Persuasion Robustly: The Optimality of Quota Rules
por: Bergemann, Dirk, et al.
Publicado: (2023)

Equitable Auctions
por: Finster, Simon, et al.
Publicado: (2024)

Shill-Proof Auctions
por: Komo, Andrew, et al.
Publicado: (2024)

Transaction Ordering Auctions
por: Schlegel, Christoph
Publicado: (2023)

Raising Bidders' Awareness in Second-Price Auctions
por: Li, Ying Xue, et al.
Publicado: (2024)

Strategic Bidding in Knapsack Auctions
por: Khezr, Peyman, et al.
Publicado: (2024)

Verifying Approximate Equilibrium in Auctions
por: Pieroth, Fabian R., et al.
Publicado: (2024)

Approximate Optimality of Linear Contracts Under Uncertainty
por: Alon, Tal, et al.
Publicado: (2022)

The Combinatorial Multi-Round Ascending Auction
por: Kasberger, Bernhard, et al.
Publicado: (2022)

Cued to Queue: Information in Waiting-Line Auctions
por: Hirsch, Jack, et al.
Publicado: (2025)

Simultaneous All-Pay Auctions with Budget Constraints
por: Liu, Yan, et al.
Publicado: (2025)

Budget-Constrained Auctions with Unassured Priors: Strategic Equivalence and Structural Properties
por: Chen, Zhaohua, et al.
Publicado: (2022)

Collusion-proof Auction Design using Side Information
por: Kudva, Sukanya, et al.
Publicado: (2025)

Prior-Independent Bidding Strategies for First-Price Auctions
por: Kumar, Rachitesh, et al.
Publicado: (2025)

To Spend or to Gain: Online Learning in Repeated Karma Auctions
por: Berriaud, Damien, et al.
Publicado: (2024)

How Do Digital Advertising Auctions Impact Product Prices?
por: Bergemann, Dirk, et al.
Publicado: (2023)

Using "Failure Costs" to Guarantee Execution Quality in Competitive and Permissionless Order Flow Auctions
por: Watts, Alex, et al.
Publicado: (2025)

Strategic Bid Shading in Real-Time Bidding Auctions in Ad Exchange Using Minority Game Theory
por: Das, Dipankar
Publicado: (2025)

Optimal Auction Design under Costly Learning
por: Ozbek, Kemal
Publicado: (2025)

Buying Data of Unknown Quality: Fisher Information Procurement Auctions
por: Hu, Yuchen, et al.
Publicado: (2026)

Deep Learning for Double Auction
por: Liu, Jiayin, et al.
Publicado: (2025)