Uncovering the Persuasive Fingerprint of LLMs in Jailbreaking Attacks
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arXiv
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| Auteurs principaux: | , , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Publié: |
2025
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| _version_ | 1866908611383394304 |
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| author | Noughabi, Havva Alizadeh Serbanescu, Julien Zarrinkalam, Fattane Dehghantanha, Ali |
| author_facet | Noughabi, Havva Alizadeh Serbanescu, Julien Zarrinkalam, Fattane Dehghantanha, Ali |
| contents | Despite recent advances, Large Language Models remain vulnerable to jailbreak attacks that bypass alignment safeguards and elicit harmful outputs. While prior research has proposed various attack strategies differing in human readability and transferability, little attention has been paid to the linguistic and psychological mechanisms that may influence a model's susceptibility to such attacks. In this paper, we examine an interdisciplinary line of research that leverages foundational theories of persuasion from the social sciences to craft adversarial prompts capable of circumventing alignment constraints in LLMs. Drawing on well-established persuasive strategies, we hypothesize that LLMs, having been trained on large-scale human-generated text, may respond more compliantly to prompts with persuasive structures. Furthermore, we investigate whether LLMs themselves exhibit distinct persuasive fingerprints that emerge in their jailbreak responses. Empirical evaluations across multiple aligned LLMs reveal that persuasion-aware prompts significantly bypass safeguards, demonstrating their potential to induce jailbreak behaviors. This work underscores the importance of cross-disciplinary insight in addressing the evolving challenges of LLM safety. The code and data are available. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2510_21983 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Uncovering the Persuasive Fingerprint of LLMs in Jailbreaking Attacks Noughabi, Havva Alizadeh Serbanescu, Julien Zarrinkalam, Fattane Dehghantanha, Ali Computation and Language Artificial Intelligence Despite recent advances, Large Language Models remain vulnerable to jailbreak attacks that bypass alignment safeguards and elicit harmful outputs. While prior research has proposed various attack strategies differing in human readability and transferability, little attention has been paid to the linguistic and psychological mechanisms that may influence a model's susceptibility to such attacks. In this paper, we examine an interdisciplinary line of research that leverages foundational theories of persuasion from the social sciences to craft adversarial prompts capable of circumventing alignment constraints in LLMs. Drawing on well-established persuasive strategies, we hypothesize that LLMs, having been trained on large-scale human-generated text, may respond more compliantly to prompts with persuasive structures. Furthermore, we investigate whether LLMs themselves exhibit distinct persuasive fingerprints that emerge in their jailbreak responses. Empirical evaluations across multiple aligned LLMs reveal that persuasion-aware prompts significantly bypass safeguards, demonstrating their potential to induce jailbreak behaviors. This work underscores the importance of cross-disciplinary insight in addressing the evolving challenges of LLM safety. The code and data are available. |
| title | Uncovering the Persuasive Fingerprint of LLMs in Jailbreaking Attacks |
| topic | Computation and Language Artificial Intelligence |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2510.21983 |