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Information-Credible Stability in Matching with Incomplete Information

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author:	Mishra, Kaibalyapati
Format:	Preprint
Published:	2025
Subjects:	Theoretical Economics
Online Access:	Acceder al recurso
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