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What Are People's Actual Utility Functions in Budget Aggregation?

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors:	Amster, Ayelet, Akirav, Lioz, Gonen, Rica, Segal-Halevi, Erel
Format:	Preprint
Published:	2025
Subjects:	Computer Science and Game Theory
Online Access:	Acceder al recurso
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