Voronoi Games on the Discrete Hypercube: Four-Player Equilibria

Fuente: arXiv
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Autore principale: Stylianou, Stelios
Natura: Preprint
Pubblicazione: 2025
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author Stylianou, Stelios
author_facet Stylianou, Stelios
contents We consider a four-player game on the discrete hypercube $Q_n = \{0,1\}^n$, where each of the four players has chosen a single vertex of the hypercube. Such a position is called a profile. Imagine there is a voter at every vertex, and each voter gives their vote to whichever player is closest to them, in terms of Hamming distance. If multiple players are tied for this smallest distance, the vote is divided equally between them. The score of a player is the total number of votes they get. (This has a natural interpretation in terms of voting theory: imagine there are $n$ binary issues and that voters are uniformly distributed in their positions on these issues, and view the players as political candidates competing for vote share.) We say that a profile is an equilibrium if no player can strictly increase their score by moving to a different vertex, while the other players maintain their original positions. Moreover, a profile is balanced if, in each of the $n$ coordinates, two players have chosen 0, and two players have chosen 1. We prove that a four-player profile is an equilibrium if and only if it is balanced, proving a conjecture of Day and Johnson.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2510_25392
institution arXiv
publishDate 2025
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Voronoi Games on the Discrete Hypercube: Four-Player Equilibria
Stylianou, Stelios
Combinatorics
We consider a four-player game on the discrete hypercube $Q_n = \{0,1\}^n$, where each of the four players has chosen a single vertex of the hypercube. Such a position is called a profile. Imagine there is a voter at every vertex, and each voter gives their vote to whichever player is closest to them, in terms of Hamming distance. If multiple players are tied for this smallest distance, the vote is divided equally between them. The score of a player is the total number of votes they get. (This has a natural interpretation in terms of voting theory: imagine there are $n$ binary issues and that voters are uniformly distributed in their positions on these issues, and view the players as political candidates competing for vote share.) We say that a profile is an equilibrium if no player can strictly increase their score by moving to a different vertex, while the other players maintain their original positions. Moreover, a profile is balanced if, in each of the $n$ coordinates, two players have chosen 0, and two players have chosen 1. We prove that a four-player profile is an equilibrium if and only if it is balanced, proving a conjecture of Day and Johnson.
title Voronoi Games on the Discrete Hypercube: Four-Player Equilibria
topic Combinatorics
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2510.25392