Near Optimal Convergence to Coarse Correlated Equilibrium in General-Sum Markov Games
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arXiv
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| Formato: | Preprint |
| Publicado: |
2025
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| _version_ | 1866912686731689984 |
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| author | Yorulmaz, Asrin Efe Başar, Tamer |
| author_facet | Yorulmaz, Asrin Efe Başar, Tamer |
| contents | No-regret learning dynamics play a central role in game theory, enabling decentralized convergence to equilibrium for concepts such as Coarse Correlated Equilibrium (CCE) or Correlated Equilibrium (CE). In this work, we improve the convergence rate to CCE in general-sum Markov games, reducing it from the previously best-known rate of $\mathcal{O}(\log^5 T / T)$ to a sharper $\mathcal{O}(\log T / T)$. This matches the best known convergence rate for CE in terms of $T$, number of iterations, while also improving the dependence on the action set size from polynomial to polylogarithmic-yielding exponential gains in high-dimensional settings. Our approach builds on recent advances in adaptive step-size techniques for no-regret algorithms in normal-form games, and extends them to the Markovian setting via a stage-wise scheme that adjusts learning rates based on real-time feedback. We frame policy updates as an instance of Optimistic Follow-the-Regularized-Leader (OFTRL), customized for value-iteration-based learning. The resulting self-play algorithm achieves, to our knowledge, the fastest known convergence rate to CCE in Markov games. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2511_02157 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Near Optimal Convergence to Coarse Correlated Equilibrium in General-Sum Markov Games Yorulmaz, Asrin Efe Başar, Tamer Computer Science and Game Theory Artificial Intelligence Machine Learning Systems and Control Optimization and Control No-regret learning dynamics play a central role in game theory, enabling decentralized convergence to equilibrium for concepts such as Coarse Correlated Equilibrium (CCE) or Correlated Equilibrium (CE). In this work, we improve the convergence rate to CCE in general-sum Markov games, reducing it from the previously best-known rate of $\mathcal{O}(\log^5 T / T)$ to a sharper $\mathcal{O}(\log T / T)$. This matches the best known convergence rate for CE in terms of $T$, number of iterations, while also improving the dependence on the action set size from polynomial to polylogarithmic-yielding exponential gains in high-dimensional settings. Our approach builds on recent advances in adaptive step-size techniques for no-regret algorithms in normal-form games, and extends them to the Markovian setting via a stage-wise scheme that adjusts learning rates based on real-time feedback. We frame policy updates as an instance of Optimistic Follow-the-Regularized-Leader (OFTRL), customized for value-iteration-based learning. The resulting self-play algorithm achieves, to our knowledge, the fastest known convergence rate to CCE in Markov games. |
| title | Near Optimal Convergence to Coarse Correlated Equilibrium in General-Sum Markov Games |
| topic | Computer Science and Game Theory Artificial Intelligence Machine Learning Systems and Control Optimization and Control |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2511.02157 |