Automation and Task Allocation Under Asymmetric Information
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arXiv
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Veröffentlicht: |
2025
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| _version_ | 1866918186228645888 |
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| author | Valenzuela-Stookey, Quitzé |
| author_facet | Valenzuela-Stookey, Quitzé |
| contents | A firm can complete the tasks needed to produce output using either machines or workers. Unlike machines, workers have private information about their preferences over tasks. I study how this information asymmetry shapes the mechanism used by the firm to allocate tasks across workers and machines. I identify important qualitative differences between the mechanisms used when information frictions are large versus small. When information frictions are small, tasks are substitutes: automating one task lowers the marginal cost of other tasks and reduces the surplus generated by workers. When frictions are large, tasks can become complements: automation can raise the marginal cost of other tasks and increase the surplus generated by workers. The results extend to a setting with multiple firms competing for workers. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2511_02675 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Automation and Task Allocation Under Asymmetric Information Valenzuela-Stookey, Quitzé Theoretical Economics A firm can complete the tasks needed to produce output using either machines or workers. Unlike machines, workers have private information about their preferences over tasks. I study how this information asymmetry shapes the mechanism used by the firm to allocate tasks across workers and machines. I identify important qualitative differences between the mechanisms used when information frictions are large versus small. When information frictions are small, tasks are substitutes: automating one task lowers the marginal cost of other tasks and reduces the surplus generated by workers. When frictions are large, tasks can become complements: automation can raise the marginal cost of other tasks and increase the surplus generated by workers. The results extend to a setting with multiple firms competing for workers. |
| title | Automation and Task Allocation Under Asymmetric Information |
| topic | Theoretical Economics |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2511.02675 |