On the Existence of Fair Allocations for Goods and Chores under Dissimilar Preferences
Fuente:
arXiv
Saved in:
| Main Authors: | Gagushin, Egor, Mertzanidis, Marios, Psomas, Alexandros |
|---|---|
| Format: | Preprint |
| Published: |
2025
|
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | |
| Tags: |
Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
|
Similar Items
On the Fairness of Normalized p-Means for Allocating Goods and Chores
by: Eckart, Owen, et al.
Published: (2024)
by: Eckart, Owen, et al.
Published: (2024)
Automating Food Drop: The Power of Two Choices for Dynamic and Fair Food Allocation
by: Mertzanidis, Marios, et al.
Published: (2024)
by: Mertzanidis, Marios, et al.
Published: (2024)
Mechanism Design via the Interim Relaxation
by: Bhawalkar, Kshipra, et al.
Published: (2024)
by: Bhawalkar, Kshipra, et al.
Published: (2024)
Mechanism Design with Delegated Bidding
by: Aggarwal, Gagan, et al.
Published: (2024)
by: Aggarwal, Gagan, et al.
Published: (2024)
Fair and Efficient Allocations Without Obvious Manipulations
by: Psomas, Alexandros, et al.
Published: (2022)
by: Psomas, Alexandros, et al.
Published: (2022)
Existence of Fair and Efficient Allocation of Indivisible Chores
by: Mahara, Ryoga
Published: (2025)
by: Mahara, Ryoga
Published: (2025)
Existence of 2-EFX Allocations of Chores
by: Garg, Jugal, et al.
Published: (2025)
by: Garg, Jugal, et al.
Published: (2025)
Equitable Allocations of Mixtures of Goods and Chores
by: Hosseini, Hadi, et al.
Published: (2025)
by: Hosseini, Hadi, et al.
Published: (2025)
Truthful Fair Division under Stochastic Valuations
by: Halpern, Daniel, et al.
Published: (2026)
by: Halpern, Daniel, et al.
Published: (2026)
Hallucinating Flows for Optimal Mechanisms
by: Mertzanidis, Marios, et al.
Published: (2025)
by: Mertzanidis, Marios, et al.
Published: (2025)
Fair Division with Indivisible Goods, Chores, and Cake
by: Aziz, Haris, et al.
Published: (2025)
by: Aziz, Haris, et al.
Published: (2025)
On Hierarchies of Fairness Notions in Cake Cutting: From Proportionality to Super Envy-Freeness
by: Mehra, Arnav, et al.
Published: (2025)
by: Mehra, Arnav, et al.
Published: (2025)
When is Truthfully Allocating Chores no Harder than Goods?
by: Li, Bo, et al.
Published: (2025)
by: Li, Bo, et al.
Published: (2025)
Fair Division Under Inaccurate Preferences
by: Dang, Trung, et al.
Published: (2026)
by: Dang, Trung, et al.
Published: (2026)
Asymptotic Fair Division: Chores Are Easier Than Goods
by: Manurangsi, Pasin, et al.
Published: (2025)
by: Manurangsi, Pasin, et al.
Published: (2025)
A Complete Landscape of EFX Allocations on Graphs: Goods, Chores and Mixed Manna
by: Li, Bo, et al.
Published: (2024)
by: Li, Bo, et al.
Published: (2024)
Existence and Computation of Fair Allocations under Constraints
by: Barman, Siddharth, et al.
Published: (2026)
by: Barman, Siddharth, et al.
Published: (2026)
Online MMS Allocation for Chores
by: Song, Jiaxin, et al.
Published: (2025)
by: Song, Jiaxin, et al.
Published: (2025)
Getting More by Knowing Less: Bayesian Incentive Compatible Mechanisms for Fair Division
by: Gkatzelis, Vasilis, et al.
Published: (2023)
by: Gkatzelis, Vasilis, et al.
Published: (2023)
On The Pursuit of EFX for Chores: Non-Existence and Approximations
by: Christoforidis, Vasilis, et al.
Published: (2024)
by: Christoforidis, Vasilis, et al.
Published: (2024)
A Fair Allocation is Approximately Optimal for Indivisible Chores, or Is It?
by: Li, Bo, et al.
Published: (2024)
by: Li, Bo, et al.
Published: (2024)
Fair Interval Scheduling of Indivisible Chores
by: Equbal, Sarfaraz, et al.
Published: (2024)
by: Equbal, Sarfaraz, et al.
Published: (2024)
Facility Location for Congesting Commuters and Generalizing the Cost-Distance Problem
by: Lianeas, Thanasis, et al.
Published: (2025)
by: Lianeas, Thanasis, et al.
Published: (2025)
Proportional and Pareto-Optimal Allocation of Chores with Subsidy
by: Garg, Jugal, et al.
Published: (2025)
by: Garg, Jugal, et al.
Published: (2025)
Approximately EFX and PO Allocations for Bivalued Chores
by: Lin, Zehan, et al.
Published: (2025)
by: Lin, Zehan, et al.
Published: (2025)
Fair Assignment of Indivisible Chores to Asymmetric Agents
by: Seddighin, Masoud, et al.
Published: (2025)
by: Seddighin, Masoud, et al.
Published: (2025)
Weighted Proportional Allocations of Indivisible Goods and Chores: Insights via Matchings
by: V., Vishwa Prakash H., et al.
Published: (2023)
by: V., Vishwa Prakash H., et al.
Published: (2023)
Fair Division with Allocator's Preference
by: Bu, Xiaolin, et al.
Published: (2023)
by: Bu, Xiaolin, et al.
Published: (2023)
Asymptotically Fair and Truthful Allocation of Public Goods
by: Kananian, Pouya, et al.
Published: (2024)
by: Kananian, Pouya, et al.
Published: (2024)
Fair and Efficient Balanced Allocation for Indivisible Goods
by: Kawase, Yasushi, et al.
Published: (2026)
by: Kawase, Yasushi, et al.
Published: (2026)
Fair Division of Chores with Budget Constraints
by: Elkind, Edith, et al.
Published: (2024)
by: Elkind, Edith, et al.
Published: (2024)
Guaranteeing MMS for All but One Agent When Allocating Indivisible Chores
by: Qiu, Jiawei, et al.
Published: (2024)
by: Qiu, Jiawei, et al.
Published: (2024)
Weighted EF1 and PO Allocations with Few Types of Agents or Chores
by: Garg, Jugal, et al.
Published: (2024)
by: Garg, Jugal, et al.
Published: (2024)
Allocating Mixed Goods with Customized Fairness and Indivisibility Ratio
by: Li, Bo, et al.
Published: (2024)
by: Li, Bo, et al.
Published: (2024)
Computing Welfare-Maximizing Fair Allocations of Indivisible Goods
by: Aziz, Haris, et al.
Published: (2020)
by: Aziz, Haris, et al.
Published: (2020)
Allocating Chores with Restricted Additive Costs: Achieving EFX, MMS, and Efficiency Simultaneously
by: Lin, Zehan, et al.
Published: (2026)
by: Lin, Zehan, et al.
Published: (2026)
Approximate EFX and Exact tEFX Allocations for Indivisible Chores: Improved Algorithms
by: Afshinmehr, Mahyar, et al.
Published: (2024)
by: Afshinmehr, Mahyar, et al.
Published: (2024)
Best-of-Both-Worlds Fair Allocation of Indivisible and Mixed Goods
by: Bu, Xiaolin, et al.
Published: (2024)
by: Bu, Xiaolin, et al.
Published: (2024)
V3rified: Revelation vs Non-Revelation Mechanisms for Decentralized Verifiable Computation
by: Gong, Tiantian, et al.
Published: (2024)
by: Gong, Tiantian, et al.
Published: (2024)
Symmetrically Fair Allocations of Indivisible Goods
by: Johnston, Connor, et al.
Published: (2024)
by: Johnston, Connor, et al.
Published: (2024)
Similar Items
-
On the Fairness of Normalized p-Means for Allocating Goods and Chores
by: Eckart, Owen, et al.
Published: (2024) -
Automating Food Drop: The Power of Two Choices for Dynamic and Fair Food Allocation
by: Mertzanidis, Marios, et al.
Published: (2024) -
Mechanism Design via the Interim Relaxation
by: Bhawalkar, Kshipra, et al.
Published: (2024) -
Mechanism Design with Delegated Bidding
by: Aggarwal, Gagan, et al.
Published: (2024) -
Fair and Efficient Allocations Without Obvious Manipulations
by: Psomas, Alexandros, et al.
Published: (2022)