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| Autori principali: | , , |
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| Natura: | Preprint |
| Pubblicazione: |
2025
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| Accesso online: | https://arxiv.org/abs/2511.03841 |
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| _version_ | 1866912689850155008 |
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| author | Louck, Yedidel Stulman, Ariel Dvir, Amit |
| author_facet | Louck, Yedidel Stulman, Ariel Dvir, Amit |
| contents | Multi-agent systems (MAS) powered by artificial intelligence (AI) are increasingly foundational to complex, distributed workflows. Yet, the security of their underlying communication protocols remains critically under-examined. This paper presents the first empirical, comparative security analysis of the official CORAL implementation and a high-fidelity, SDK-based ACP implementation, benchmarked against a literature-based evaluation of A2A. Using a 14 point vulnerability taxonomy, we systematically assess their defenses across authentication, authorization, integrity, confidentiality, and availability. Our results reveal a pronounced security dichotomy: CORAL exhibits a robust architectural design, particularly in its transport-layer message validation and session isolation, but suffers from critical implementation-level vulnerabilities, including authentication and authorization failures at its SSE gateway. Conversely, ACP's architectural flexibility, most notably its optional JWS enforcement, translates into high-impact integrity and confidentiality flaws. We contextualize these findings within current industry trends, highlighting that existing protocols remain insufficiently secure. As a path forward, we recommend a hybrid approach that combines CORAL's integrated architecture with ACP's mandatory per-message integrity guarantees, laying the groundwork for resilient, next-generation agent communications. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2511_03841 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Security Analysis of Agentic AI Communication Protocols: A Comparative Evaluation Louck, Yedidel Stulman, Ariel Dvir, Amit Cryptography and Security Multi-agent systems (MAS) powered by artificial intelligence (AI) are increasingly foundational to complex, distributed workflows. Yet, the security of their underlying communication protocols remains critically under-examined. This paper presents the first empirical, comparative security analysis of the official CORAL implementation and a high-fidelity, SDK-based ACP implementation, benchmarked against a literature-based evaluation of A2A. Using a 14 point vulnerability taxonomy, we systematically assess their defenses across authentication, authorization, integrity, confidentiality, and availability. Our results reveal a pronounced security dichotomy: CORAL exhibits a robust architectural design, particularly in its transport-layer message validation and session isolation, but suffers from critical implementation-level vulnerabilities, including authentication and authorization failures at its SSE gateway. Conversely, ACP's architectural flexibility, most notably its optional JWS enforcement, translates into high-impact integrity and confidentiality flaws. We contextualize these findings within current industry trends, highlighting that existing protocols remain insufficiently secure. As a path forward, we recommend a hybrid approach that combines CORAL's integrated architecture with ACP's mandatory per-message integrity guarantees, laying the groundwork for resilient, next-generation agent communications. |
| title | Security Analysis of Agentic AI Communication Protocols: A Comparative Evaluation |
| topic | Cryptography and Security |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2511.03841 |