Optimal Selection Using Algorithmic Rankings with Side Information
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arXiv
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| Auteurs principaux: | , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Publié: |
2025
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| _version_ | 1866917293101940736 |
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| author | Donahue, Kate Immorlica, Nicole Lucier, Brendan |
| author_facet | Donahue, Kate Immorlica, Nicole Lucier, Brendan |
| contents | Motivated by online platforms such as job markets, we study an agent choosing from a list of candidates, each with a hidden quality that determines match value. The agent observes only a noisy ranking of the candidates plus a binary signal that indicates whether each candidate is "free" or "busy". Being busy is positively correlated with higher quality, but can also reduce value due to decreased availability. We study the agent's optimal selection problem in the presence of ranking noise and free-busy signals and ask how the accuracy of the ranking tool impacts outcomes. In a setting with one high-valued candidate and an arbitrary number of low-valued candidates, we show that increased accuracy of the ranking tool can result in suboptimal social outcomes. For example, increased accuracy may mean that agents may be more likely to make offers to busy candidates, and (counter-intuitively) may be more likely to select lower-ranked candidates. We further discuss conditions under which these results extend to more general settings. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2511_04867 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Optimal Selection Using Algorithmic Rankings with Side Information Donahue, Kate Immorlica, Nicole Lucier, Brendan Computer Science and Game Theory Motivated by online platforms such as job markets, we study an agent choosing from a list of candidates, each with a hidden quality that determines match value. The agent observes only a noisy ranking of the candidates plus a binary signal that indicates whether each candidate is "free" or "busy". Being busy is positively correlated with higher quality, but can also reduce value due to decreased availability. We study the agent's optimal selection problem in the presence of ranking noise and free-busy signals and ask how the accuracy of the ranking tool impacts outcomes. In a setting with one high-valued candidate and an arbitrary number of low-valued candidates, we show that increased accuracy of the ranking tool can result in suboptimal social outcomes. For example, increased accuracy may mean that agents may be more likely to make offers to busy candidates, and (counter-intuitively) may be more likely to select lower-ranked candidates. We further discuss conditions under which these results extend to more general settings. |
| title | Optimal Selection Using Algorithmic Rankings with Side Information |
| topic | Computer Science and Game Theory |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2511.04867 |