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| Main Authors: | , , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Published: |
2025
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://arxiv.org/abs/2511.04993 |
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| _version_ | 1866910259483770880 |
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| author | Guan, Yanru Zhang, Jiahao Feng, Zhe Lin, Tao |
| author_facet | Guan, Yanru Zhang, Jiahao Feng, Zhe Lin, Tao |
| contents | While the auto-bidding literature predominantly considers independent bidding, we investigate the coordination problem among multiple auto-bidders in online advertising platforms. Two motivating scenarios are: collaborative bidding among multiple bidders managed by a third-party bidding agent, and strategic bid selection for multiple ad campaigns managed by a single advertiser. We formalize this coordination problem as a theoretical model and investigate the coordination mechanism where only the highest-value bidder competes with outside bidders, while other coordinated bidders refrain from competing. We demonstrate that such a coordination mechanism dominates independent bidding, improving both Return-on-Spend (RoS) compliance and the total value accrued for the participating auto-bidders or ad campaigns, for a broad class of auto-bidding algorithms. Additionally, our simulations on synthetic and real-world datasets support the theoretical result that coordination outperforms independent bidding. These findings highlight both the theoretical potential and the practical robustness of coordinated auto-bidding in online auctions. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2511_04993 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | On the Coordination of Value-Maximizing Bidders Guan, Yanru Zhang, Jiahao Feng, Zhe Lin, Tao Computer Science and Game Theory While the auto-bidding literature predominantly considers independent bidding, we investigate the coordination problem among multiple auto-bidders in online advertising platforms. Two motivating scenarios are: collaborative bidding among multiple bidders managed by a third-party bidding agent, and strategic bid selection for multiple ad campaigns managed by a single advertiser. We formalize this coordination problem as a theoretical model and investigate the coordination mechanism where only the highest-value bidder competes with outside bidders, while other coordinated bidders refrain from competing. We demonstrate that such a coordination mechanism dominates independent bidding, improving both Return-on-Spend (RoS) compliance and the total value accrued for the participating auto-bidders or ad campaigns, for a broad class of auto-bidding algorithms. Additionally, our simulations on synthetic and real-world datasets support the theoretical result that coordination outperforms independent bidding. These findings highlight both the theoretical potential and the practical robustness of coordinated auto-bidding in online auctions. |
| title | On the Coordination of Value-Maximizing Bidders |
| topic | Computer Science and Game Theory |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2511.04993 |