The Coarse Nash Bargaining Solutions
Fuente:
arXiv
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| Autori principali: | , |
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| Natura: | Preprint |
| Pubblicazione: |
2025
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| _version_ | 1866914206191714304 |
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| author | Nakada, Satoshi Nakamura, Kensei |
| author_facet | Nakada, Satoshi Nakamura, Kensei |
| contents | This paper studies the axiomatic bargaining problem and proposes a new class of bargaining solutions, called coarse Nash solutions. These solutions assign to each problem a set of outcomes coarser than that chosen by the classical Nash solution (Nash, 1950). Our main result shows that these solutions can be characterized by new rationality axioms for choice correspondences, which are modifications of Nash's independence of irrelevant alternatives (or more precisely, Arrow's (1959) choice axiom), when combined with standard axioms. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2511_05019 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | The Coarse Nash Bargaining Solutions Nakada, Satoshi Nakamura, Kensei Theoretical Economics This paper studies the axiomatic bargaining problem and proposes a new class of bargaining solutions, called coarse Nash solutions. These solutions assign to each problem a set of outcomes coarser than that chosen by the classical Nash solution (Nash, 1950). Our main result shows that these solutions can be characterized by new rationality axioms for choice correspondences, which are modifications of Nash's independence of irrelevant alternatives (or more precisely, Arrow's (1959) choice axiom), when combined with standard axioms. |
| title | The Coarse Nash Bargaining Solutions |
| topic | Theoretical Economics |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2511.05019 |