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| Auteurs principaux: | , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Publié: |
2025
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| Accès en ligne: | https://arxiv.org/abs/2511.05100 |
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| _version_ | 1866911253615607808 |
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| author | Mumtaz, Arslan Singh, Mridula |
| author_facet | Mumtaz, Arslan Singh, Mridula |
| contents | Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) provide Positioning, Navigation, and Timing (PNT) information to over 4 billion devices worldwide. Despite its pervasive use in safety critical and high precision applications, GNSS remains vulnerable to spoofing attacks. Cryptographic enhancements, such as the use of TESLA protocol in Galileo, to provide navigation message authentication do not mitigate time of arrival manipulations. In this paper, we propose TRICK, a primitive for secure positioning that closes this gap by introducing a fundamentally new approach that only requires two way communications with a single reference node along with multiple broadcast signals. Unlike classical Verifiable Multilateration (VM), which requires establishing two way communication with each reference nodes, our solution relies on only two measurements with a trusted Low Earth Orbiting (LEO) satellite and combines broadcast navigation signals. We rigorously prove that combining the LEO satellite based two way range measurements and multiple one way ranges such as from broadcast signals of GNSS into ellipsoidal constraint restores the same guarantees as offered by VM whilst using minimal infrastructure and message exchanges. Through detailed analysis, we show that our approach reliably detects spoofing attempts while adding negligible computation overhead. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2511_05100 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | TRICK: Time and Range Integrity ChecK using Low Earth Orbiting Satellite for Securing GNSS Mumtaz, Arslan Singh, Mridula Cryptography and Security Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) provide Positioning, Navigation, and Timing (PNT) information to over 4 billion devices worldwide. Despite its pervasive use in safety critical and high precision applications, GNSS remains vulnerable to spoofing attacks. Cryptographic enhancements, such as the use of TESLA protocol in Galileo, to provide navigation message authentication do not mitigate time of arrival manipulations. In this paper, we propose TRICK, a primitive for secure positioning that closes this gap by introducing a fundamentally new approach that only requires two way communications with a single reference node along with multiple broadcast signals. Unlike classical Verifiable Multilateration (VM), which requires establishing two way communication with each reference nodes, our solution relies on only two measurements with a trusted Low Earth Orbiting (LEO) satellite and combines broadcast navigation signals. We rigorously prove that combining the LEO satellite based two way range measurements and multiple one way ranges such as from broadcast signals of GNSS into ellipsoidal constraint restores the same guarantees as offered by VM whilst using minimal infrastructure and message exchanges. Through detailed analysis, we show that our approach reliably detects spoofing attempts while adding negligible computation overhead. |
| title | TRICK: Time and Range Integrity ChecK using Low Earth Orbiting Satellite for Securing GNSS |
| topic | Cryptography and Security |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2511.05100 |