Stackelberg Game-Driven Defense for ISAC Against Channel Attacks in Low-Altitude Networks
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arXiv
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| Format: | Preprint |
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2025
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| _version_ | 1866912696122736640 |
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| author | Wang, Jiacheng Zhao, Changyuan Niyato, Dusit Sun, Geng Yuan, Weijie Jamalipour, Abbas Xiang, Tao |
| author_facet | Wang, Jiacheng Zhao, Changyuan Niyato, Dusit Sun, Geng Yuan, Weijie Jamalipour, Abbas Xiang, Tao |
| contents | The increasing saturation of terrestrial resources has driven economic activities into low-altitude airspace. These activities, such as air taxis, rely on low-altitude wireless networks, and one key enabling technology is integrated sensing and communication (ISAC). However, in low-altitude airspace, ISAC is vulnerable to channel-access attacks, thereby degrading performance and threatening safety. To address this, we propose a defense framework based on a Stackelberg game. Specifically, we first model the system under attack, deriving metrics for the communication and the sensing to quantify performance. Then, we formulate the interaction as a three-player game where a malicious attacker acts as the leader, while the legitimate drone and ground base station act as followers. Using a backward induction algorithm, we obtain the Stackelberg equilibrium, allowing the defenders to dynamically adjust their strategies to mitigate the attack. Simulation results verify that the proposed algorithm converges to a stable solution and outperforms existing baselines, ensuring reliable ISAC performance for critical low-altitude applications. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2511_06359 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Stackelberg Game-Driven Defense for ISAC Against Channel Attacks in Low-Altitude Networks Wang, Jiacheng Zhao, Changyuan Niyato, Dusit Sun, Geng Yuan, Weijie Jamalipour, Abbas Xiang, Tao Signal Processing Computer Science and Game Theory The increasing saturation of terrestrial resources has driven economic activities into low-altitude airspace. These activities, such as air taxis, rely on low-altitude wireless networks, and one key enabling technology is integrated sensing and communication (ISAC). However, in low-altitude airspace, ISAC is vulnerable to channel-access attacks, thereby degrading performance and threatening safety. To address this, we propose a defense framework based on a Stackelberg game. Specifically, we first model the system under attack, deriving metrics for the communication and the sensing to quantify performance. Then, we formulate the interaction as a three-player game where a malicious attacker acts as the leader, while the legitimate drone and ground base station act as followers. Using a backward induction algorithm, we obtain the Stackelberg equilibrium, allowing the defenders to dynamically adjust their strategies to mitigate the attack. Simulation results verify that the proposed algorithm converges to a stable solution and outperforms existing baselines, ensuring reliable ISAC performance for critical low-altitude applications. |
| title | Stackelberg Game-Driven Defense for ISAC Against Channel Attacks in Low-Altitude Networks |
| topic | Signal Processing Computer Science and Game Theory |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2511.06359 |