A Double Secretary Problem

Fuente: arXiv
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Hauptverfasser: Hsiau, Shoou-Ren, Lin, Yi-Shen
Format: Preprint
Veröffentlicht: 2025
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author Hsiau, Shoou-Ren
Lin, Yi-Shen
author_facet Hsiau, Shoou-Ren
Lin, Yi-Shen
contents We consider a double secretary problem which contains $2n$ applicants of $n$ different qualities, two of each quality. As in the classical secretary problem (CSP), the applicants are interviewed sequentially in a random order by a manager and the manager wants to find an optimal stopping rule that maximizes the probability of selecting one of the two best applicants. We prove that the problem leads to a monotone structure and so the corresponding one-stage look-ahead rule (which is of threshold type) is optimal. The limiting behavior of the rule and of the maximum probability are studied and compared with that of the CSP.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2511_07201
institution arXiv
publishDate 2025
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle A Double Secretary Problem
Hsiau, Shoou-Ren
Lin, Yi-Shen
Probability
60G40, 62L15
We consider a double secretary problem which contains $2n$ applicants of $n$ different qualities, two of each quality. As in the classical secretary problem (CSP), the applicants are interviewed sequentially in a random order by a manager and the manager wants to find an optimal stopping rule that maximizes the probability of selecting one of the two best applicants. We prove that the problem leads to a monotone structure and so the corresponding one-stage look-ahead rule (which is of threshold type) is optimal. The limiting behavior of the rule and of the maximum probability are studied and compared with that of the CSP.
title A Double Secretary Problem
topic Probability
60G40, 62L15
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2511.07201