Nash-equilibrium Seeking Algorithm for Power-Allocation Games on Networks of International Relations
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arXiv
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| Auteurs principaux: | , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Publié: |
2025
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| _version_ | 1866909930235101184 |
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| author | Zhang, Chuanzhe Li, Yuke Mei, Wenjun |
| author_facet | Zhang, Chuanzhe Li, Yuke Mei, Wenjun |
| contents | In the field of international security, understanding the strategic interactions between countries within a networked context is crucial. Our previous research has introduced a ``games-on-signed graphs'' framework~\cite{LiMorse2022} to analyze these interactions. While the framework is intended to be basic and general, there is much left to be explored, particularly in capturing the complexity of strategic scenarios in international relations. Our paper aims to fill this gap in two key ways. First, we modify the existing preference axioms to allow for a more nuanced understanding of how countries pursue self-survival, defense of allies, and offense toward adversaries. Second, we introduce a novel algorithm that proves the existence of a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium for these revised games. To validate our model, we employ historical data from the year 1940 as the game input and predict countries' survivability. Our contributions thus extend the real-world applicability of the original framework, offering a more comprehensive view of strategic interactions in a networked security environment. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2511_08033 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Nash-equilibrium Seeking Algorithm for Power-Allocation Games on Networks of International Relations Zhang, Chuanzhe Li, Yuke Mei, Wenjun Computer Science and Game Theory Systems and Control In the field of international security, understanding the strategic interactions between countries within a networked context is crucial. Our previous research has introduced a ``games-on-signed graphs'' framework~\cite{LiMorse2022} to analyze these interactions. While the framework is intended to be basic and general, there is much left to be explored, particularly in capturing the complexity of strategic scenarios in international relations. Our paper aims to fill this gap in two key ways. First, we modify the existing preference axioms to allow for a more nuanced understanding of how countries pursue self-survival, defense of allies, and offense toward adversaries. Second, we introduce a novel algorithm that proves the existence of a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium for these revised games. To validate our model, we employ historical data from the year 1940 as the game input and predict countries' survivability. Our contributions thus extend the real-world applicability of the original framework, offering a more comprehensive view of strategic interactions in a networked security environment. |
| title | Nash-equilibrium Seeking Algorithm for Power-Allocation Games on Networks of International Relations |
| topic | Computer Science and Game Theory Systems and Control |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2511.08033 |