Truth, Justice, and Secrecy: Cake Cutting Under Privacy Constraints
Fuente:
arXiv
Saved in:
| Main Authors: | , , , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Preprint |
| Published: |
2025
|
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | |
| Tags: |
Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
|
| _version_ | 1866909900364316672 |
|---|---|
| author | Salman, Yaron Tassa, Tamir Lev, Omer Zivan, Roie |
| author_facet | Salman, Yaron Tassa, Tamir Lev, Omer Zivan, Roie |
| contents | Cake-cutting algorithms, which aim to fairly allocate a continuous resource based on individual agent preferences, have seen significant progress over the past two decades. Much of the research has concentrated on fairness, with comparatively less attention given to other important aspects. Chen et al. (2010) introduced an algorithm that, in addition to ensuring fairness, was strategyproof -- meaning agents had no incentive to misreport their valuations. However, even in the absence of strategic incentives to misreport, agents may still hesitate to reveal their true preferences due to privacy concerns (e.g., when allocating advertising time between firms, revealing preferences could inadvertently expose planned marketing strategies or product launch timelines). In this work, we extend the strategyproof algorithm of Chen et al. by introducing a privacy-preserving dimension. To the best of our knowledge, we present the first private cake-cutting protocol, and, in addition, this protocol is also envy-free and strategyproof. Our approach replaces the algorithm's centralized computation with a novel adaptation of cryptographic techniques, enabling privacy without compromising fairness or strategyproofness. Thus, our protocol encourages agents to report their true preferences not only because they are not incentivized to lie, but also because they are protected from having their preferences exposed. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2511_09882 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Truth, Justice, and Secrecy: Cake Cutting Under Privacy Constraints Salman, Yaron Tassa, Tamir Lev, Omer Zivan, Roie Computer Science and Game Theory Multiagent Systems Cake-cutting algorithms, which aim to fairly allocate a continuous resource based on individual agent preferences, have seen significant progress over the past two decades. Much of the research has concentrated on fairness, with comparatively less attention given to other important aspects. Chen et al. (2010) introduced an algorithm that, in addition to ensuring fairness, was strategyproof -- meaning agents had no incentive to misreport their valuations. However, even in the absence of strategic incentives to misreport, agents may still hesitate to reveal their true preferences due to privacy concerns (e.g., when allocating advertising time between firms, revealing preferences could inadvertently expose planned marketing strategies or product launch timelines). In this work, we extend the strategyproof algorithm of Chen et al. by introducing a privacy-preserving dimension. To the best of our knowledge, we present the first private cake-cutting protocol, and, in addition, this protocol is also envy-free and strategyproof. Our approach replaces the algorithm's centralized computation with a novel adaptation of cryptographic techniques, enabling privacy without compromising fairness or strategyproofness. Thus, our protocol encourages agents to report their true preferences not only because they are not incentivized to lie, but also because they are protected from having their preferences exposed. |
| title | Truth, Justice, and Secrecy: Cake Cutting Under Privacy Constraints |
| topic | Computer Science and Game Theory Multiagent Systems |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2511.09882 |