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Main Authors: Liu, Le, Kawano, Yu, Cao, Ming
Format: Preprint
Published: 2025
Subjects:
Online Access:https://arxiv.org/abs/2511.10771
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author Liu, Le
Kawano, Yu
Cao, Ming
author_facet Liu, Le
Kawano, Yu
Cao, Ming
contents For systems whose states implicate sensitive information, their privacy is of great concern. While notions like differential privacy have been successfully introduced to dynamical systems, it is still unclear how a system's privacy can be properly protected when facing the challenging yet frequently-encountered scenario where an adversary possesses prior knowledge, e.g., the steady state, of the system. This paper presents a new systematic approach to protect the privacy of a discrete-time linear time-invariant system against adversaries knowledgeable of the system's prior information. We employ a tailored \emph{pointwise maximal leakage (PML) privacy} criterion. PML characterizes the worst-case privacy performance, which is sharply different from that of the better-known mutual-information privacy. We derive necessary and sufficient conditions for PML privacy and construct tractable design procedures. Furthermore, our analysis leads to insight into how PML privacy, differential privacy, and mutual-information privacy are related. We then revisit Kalman filters from the perspective of PML privacy and derive a lower bound on the steady-state estimation-error covariance in terms of the PML parameters. Finally, the derived results are illustrated in a case study of privacy protection for distributed sensing in smart buildings.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2511_10771
institution arXiv
publishDate 2025
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Privacy protection under the exposure of systems' prior information
Liu, Le
Kawano, Yu
Cao, Ming
Systems and Control
Information Theory
Signal Processing
For systems whose states implicate sensitive information, their privacy is of great concern. While notions like differential privacy have been successfully introduced to dynamical systems, it is still unclear how a system's privacy can be properly protected when facing the challenging yet frequently-encountered scenario where an adversary possesses prior knowledge, e.g., the steady state, of the system. This paper presents a new systematic approach to protect the privacy of a discrete-time linear time-invariant system against adversaries knowledgeable of the system's prior information. We employ a tailored \emph{pointwise maximal leakage (PML) privacy} criterion. PML characterizes the worst-case privacy performance, which is sharply different from that of the better-known mutual-information privacy. We derive necessary and sufficient conditions for PML privacy and construct tractable design procedures. Furthermore, our analysis leads to insight into how PML privacy, differential privacy, and mutual-information privacy are related. We then revisit Kalman filters from the perspective of PML privacy and derive a lower bound on the steady-state estimation-error covariance in terms of the PML parameters. Finally, the derived results are illustrated in a case study of privacy protection for distributed sensing in smart buildings.
title Privacy protection under the exposure of systems' prior information
topic Systems and Control
Information Theory
Signal Processing
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2511.10771