SALT-V: Lightweight Authentication for 5G V2X Broadcasting

Fuente: arXiv
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Hauptverfasser: Cao, Liu, Wang, Weizheng, Xie, Qipeng, Wei, Dongyu, Zhang, Lyutianyang
Format: Preprint
Veröffentlicht: 2025
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author Cao, Liu
Wang, Weizheng
Xie, Qipeng
Wei, Dongyu
Zhang, Lyutianyang
author_facet Cao, Liu
Wang, Weizheng
Xie, Qipeng
Wei, Dongyu
Zhang, Lyutianyang
contents Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) communication faces a critical authentication dilemma: traditional public-key schemes like ECDSA provide strong security but impose 2 ms verification delays unsuitable for collision avoidance, while symmetric approaches like TESLA achieve microsecond-level efficiency at the cost of 20-100 ms key disclosure latency. Neither meets 5G New Radio (NR)-V2X's stringent requirements for both immediate authentication and computational efficiency. This paper presents SALT-V, a novel hybrid authentication framework that reconciles this fundamental trade-off through intelligent protocol stratification. SALT-V employs ECDSA signatures for 10% of traffic (BOOT frames) to establish sender trust, then leverages this trust anchor to authenticate 90% of messages (DATA frames) using lightweight GMAC operations. The core innovation - an Ephemeral Session Tag (EST) whitelist mechanism - enables 95% of messages to achieve immediate verification without waiting for key disclosure, while Bloom filter integration provides O(1) revocation checking in 1 us. Comprehensive evaluation demonstrates that SALT-V achieves 0.035 ms average computation time (57x faster than pure ECDSA), 1 ms end-to-end latency, 41-byte overhead, and linear scalability to 2000 vehicles, making it the first practical solution to satisfy all safety-critical requirements for real-time V2X deployment.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2511_11028
institution arXiv
publishDate 2025
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle SALT-V: Lightweight Authentication for 5G V2X Broadcasting
Cao, Liu
Wang, Weizheng
Xie, Qipeng
Wei, Dongyu
Zhang, Lyutianyang
Cryptography and Security
Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) communication faces a critical authentication dilemma: traditional public-key schemes like ECDSA provide strong security but impose 2 ms verification delays unsuitable for collision avoidance, while symmetric approaches like TESLA achieve microsecond-level efficiency at the cost of 20-100 ms key disclosure latency. Neither meets 5G New Radio (NR)-V2X's stringent requirements for both immediate authentication and computational efficiency. This paper presents SALT-V, a novel hybrid authentication framework that reconciles this fundamental trade-off through intelligent protocol stratification. SALT-V employs ECDSA signatures for 10% of traffic (BOOT frames) to establish sender trust, then leverages this trust anchor to authenticate 90% of messages (DATA frames) using lightweight GMAC operations. The core innovation - an Ephemeral Session Tag (EST) whitelist mechanism - enables 95% of messages to achieve immediate verification without waiting for key disclosure, while Bloom filter integration provides O(1) revocation checking in 1 us. Comprehensive evaluation demonstrates that SALT-V achieves 0.035 ms average computation time (57x faster than pure ECDSA), 1 ms end-to-end latency, 41-byte overhead, and linear scalability to 2000 vehicles, making it the first practical solution to satisfy all safety-critical requirements for real-time V2X deployment.
title SALT-V: Lightweight Authentication for 5G V2X Broadcasting
topic Cryptography and Security
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2511.11028