Image de couverture de livre

Complete Exchange Mechanisms

Fuente: arXiv

Enregistré dans:

Détails bibliographiques
Auteurs principaux:	Kitahara, Minoru, Uno, Hiroshi
Format:	Preprint
Publié:	2025
Sujets:	Theoretical Economics
Accès en ligne:	Acceder al recurso
Tags:	Ajouter un tag Pas de tags, Soyez le premier à ajouter un tag!

Documents similaires

A Stable and Strategy-Proof Controlled School Choice Mechanism with Integrated and Flexible Rules
par: Kitahara, Minoru, et autres
Publié: (2025)

School Choice with Multiple Priorities
par: Kitahara, Minoru, et autres
Publié: (2023)

Marginal Mechanisms For Balanced Exchange
par: Manjunath, Vikram, et autres
Publié: (2025)

Innovation, Spillovers and Economic Geography
par: Gaspar, José M., et autres
Publié: (2025)

Innovation through intra and inter-regional interaction in economic geography
par: Gaspar, José M., et autres
Publié: (2022)

Sampling Logit Equilibrium and Endogenous Payoff Distortion
par: Osawa, Minoru
Publié: (2026)

Farkas' Lemma and Complete Indifference
par: Herold, Florian, et autres
Publié: (2024)

Rethinking Arrow--Debreu: A New Framework for Exchange, Time, and Uncertainty
par: Riane, Nizar
Publié: (2025)

Efficient Major Transition Exchange under Distributional and Dual Priority-respecting Constraints
par: Cheng, Yao, et autres
Publié: (2025)

Necessity of Conserved Quantities for Axiomatic Completeness of Classical Economic Theories
par: Gat, Sidharth
Publié: (2025)

Single-Peaked Domain Augmented with Complete Indifference: A Characterization of Target Rules with a Default
par: De, Parikshit, et autres
Publié: (2026)

Power and Freedom in Mechanisms
par: Basteck, Christian, et autres
Publié: (2025)

Calibrated Mechanism Design
par: Doval, Laura, et autres
Publié: (2025)

Visibly Fair Mechanisms
par: Bó, Inácio, et autres
Publié: (2025)

Local Priority Mechanisms
par: Root, Joseph, et autres
Publié: (2023)

Contextually Private Mechanisms
par: Haupt, Andreas, et autres
Publié: (2021)

Self-Confirming Mechanisms
par: Feng, Zhiming, et autres
Publié: (2026)

Designing Simple Mechanisms
par: Li, Shengwu
Publié: (2024)

Strategically Analogous Mechanisms
par: Feffer, Joseph, et autres
Publié: (2026)

Mechanism Design with Information Leakage
par: Häfner, Samuel, et autres
Publié: (2025)

Mechanism Design by a Politician
par: Bolgè, Giovanni Valvassori
Publié: (2024)

Mechanism Design with Endogenous Perception
par: Balzer, Benjamin, et autres
Publié: (2024)

Supply Chain Coordination Mechanism Design: Consensus Planning Protocol Meets Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Mechanism
par: Bergemann, Dirk, et autres
Publié: (2026)

On the Dominance of Truth-Telling in Gradual Mechanisms
par: Wang, Wenqian, et autres
Publié: (2025)

Emergence of Homophily under Contextual Mechanisms
par: Weng, Jiaxing, et autres
Publié: (2025)

Incentives and Efficiency in Constrained Allocation Mechanisms
par: Root, Joseph, et autres
Publié: (2020)

Coordination Mechanisms with Partially Specified Probabilities
par: Giordano, Francesco
Publié: (2026)

Lexicographic Robustness and the Efficiency of Optimal Mechanisms
par: Kambhampati, Ashwin
Publié: (2026)

Optimal Refund Mechanism with Consumer Learning
par: Lyu, Qianjun
Publié: (2024)

A Theory of Auditability for Allocation Mechanisms
par: Grigoryan, Aram, et autres
Publié: (2023)

Dynamic Mechanism Collapse: A Boundary Characterization
par: Zeng, Xiaopeng, et autres
Publié: (2025)

Information Design and Mechanism Design: An Integrated Framework
par: Bergemann, Dirk, et autres
Publié: (2026)

Quota Mechanisms: Finite-Sample Optimality and Robustness
par: Ball, Ian, et autres
Publié: (2023)

Non-Obvious Manipulability of the Rank-Minimizing Mechanism
par: Troyan, Peter
Publié: (2022)

Information About Other Players in Mechanism Design
par: Yan, Eric
Publié: (2024)

Games under the Tiered Deferred Acceptance Mechanism
par: Xie, Jiarui
Publié: (2024)

Optimal Decision Mechanisms for Committees: Acquitting the Guilty
par: Kattwinkel, Deniz, et autres
Publié: (2024)

Robustly Optimal Mechanisms for Selling Multiple Goods
par: Che, Yeon-Koo, et autres
Publié: (2021)

A Note on Obvious Manipulations of Quantile Stable Mechanisms
par: Arribillaga, R. Pablo, et autres
Publié: (2025)

Strictly Proper Scoring Mechanisms Without Expected Arbitrage
par: Edwards, Jack
Publié: (2024)