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Collusion-proof Auction Design using Side Information

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors:	Kudva, Sukanya, Dowling, Edward, Aswani, Anil
Format:	Preprint
Published:	2025
Subjects:	Computer Science and Game Theory Theoretical Economics
Online Access:	Acceder al recurso
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