Prrr: Personal Random Rewards for Blockchain Reporting

Fuente: arXiv
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Auteurs principaux: Chen, Hongyin, Ke, Yubin, Deng, Xiaotie, Eyal, Ittay
Format: Preprint
Publié: 2025
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author Chen, Hongyin
Ke, Yubin
Deng, Xiaotie
Eyal, Ittay
author_facet Chen, Hongyin
Ke, Yubin
Deng, Xiaotie
Eyal, Ittay
contents Smart contracts, the stateful programs running on blockchains, often rely on reports. Publishers are paid to publish these reports on the blockchain. Designing protocols that incentivize timely reporting is the prevalent reporting problem. But existing solutions face a security-performance trade-off: Relying on a small set of trusted publishers introduces centralization risks, while allowing open publication results in an excessive number of reports on the blockchain. We identify the root cause of this trade-off to be the standard symmetric reward design, which treats all reports equally. We prove that no symmetric-reward mechanism can overcome the trade-off. We present Personal Random Rewards for Reporting (Prrr), a protocol that assigns random heterogeneous values to reports. We call this novel mechanism-design concept Ex-Ante Synthetic Asymmetry. To the best of our knowledge, Prrr is the first game-theoretic mechanism (in any context) that deliberately forms participant asymmetry. Prrr employs a second-price-style settlement to allocate rewards, ensuring incentive compatibility and achieving both security and efficiency. Following the protocol constitutes a Subgame-Perfect Nash Equilibrium, robust against collusion and Sybil attacks. Prrr is applicable to numerous smart contracts that rely on timely reports.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2511_12626
institution arXiv
publishDate 2025
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Prrr: Personal Random Rewards for Blockchain Reporting
Chen, Hongyin
Ke, Yubin
Deng, Xiaotie
Eyal, Ittay
Cryptography and Security
Computer Science and Game Theory
Smart contracts, the stateful programs running on blockchains, often rely on reports. Publishers are paid to publish these reports on the blockchain. Designing protocols that incentivize timely reporting is the prevalent reporting problem. But existing solutions face a security-performance trade-off: Relying on a small set of trusted publishers introduces centralization risks, while allowing open publication results in an excessive number of reports on the blockchain. We identify the root cause of this trade-off to be the standard symmetric reward design, which treats all reports equally. We prove that no symmetric-reward mechanism can overcome the trade-off. We present Personal Random Rewards for Reporting (Prrr), a protocol that assigns random heterogeneous values to reports. We call this novel mechanism-design concept Ex-Ante Synthetic Asymmetry. To the best of our knowledge, Prrr is the first game-theoretic mechanism (in any context) that deliberately forms participant asymmetry. Prrr employs a second-price-style settlement to allocate rewards, ensuring incentive compatibility and achieving both security and efficiency. Following the protocol constitutes a Subgame-Perfect Nash Equilibrium, robust against collusion and Sybil attacks. Prrr is applicable to numerous smart contracts that rely on timely reports.
title Prrr: Personal Random Rewards for Blockchain Reporting
topic Cryptography and Security
Computer Science and Game Theory
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2511.12626