Whistledown: Combining User-Level Privacy with Conversational Coherence in LLMs
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arXiv
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| Autori principali: | , |
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| Natura: | Preprint |
| Pubblicazione: |
2025
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| _version_ | 1866911270200934400 |
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| author | McMurray, Chelsea Tirmazi, Hayder |
| author_facet | McMurray, Chelsea Tirmazi, Hayder |
| contents | Users increasingly rely on large language models (LLMs) for personal, emotionally charged, and socially sensitive conversations. However, prompts sent to cloud-hosted models can contain personally identifiable information (PII) that users do not want logged, retained, or leaked. We observe this to be especially acute when users discuss friends, coworkers, or adversaries, i.e., when they spill the tea. Enterprises face the same challenge when they want to use LLMs for internal communication and decision-making.
In this whitepaper, we present Whistledown, a best-effort privacy layer that modifies prompts before they are sent to the LLM. Whistledown combines pseudonymization and $ε$-local differential privacy ($ε$-LDP) with transformation caching to provide best-effort privacy protection without sacrificing conversational utility. Whistledown is designed to have low compute and memory overhead, allowing it to be deployed directly on a client's device in the case of individual users. For enterprise users, Whistledown is deployed centrally within a zero-trust gateway that runs on an enterprise's trusted infrastructure. Whistledown requires no changes to the existing APIs of popular LLM providers. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2511_13319 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Whistledown: Combining User-Level Privacy with Conversational Coherence in LLMs McMurray, Chelsea Tirmazi, Hayder Cryptography and Security Artificial Intelligence Users increasingly rely on large language models (LLMs) for personal, emotionally charged, and socially sensitive conversations. However, prompts sent to cloud-hosted models can contain personally identifiable information (PII) that users do not want logged, retained, or leaked. We observe this to be especially acute when users discuss friends, coworkers, or adversaries, i.e., when they spill the tea. Enterprises face the same challenge when they want to use LLMs for internal communication and decision-making. In this whitepaper, we present Whistledown, a best-effort privacy layer that modifies prompts before they are sent to the LLM. Whistledown combines pseudonymization and $ε$-local differential privacy ($ε$-LDP) with transformation caching to provide best-effort privacy protection without sacrificing conversational utility. Whistledown is designed to have low compute and memory overhead, allowing it to be deployed directly on a client's device in the case of individual users. For enterprise users, Whistledown is deployed centrally within a zero-trust gateway that runs on an enterprise's trusted infrastructure. Whistledown requires no changes to the existing APIs of popular LLM providers. |
| title | Whistledown: Combining User-Level Privacy with Conversational Coherence in LLMs |
| topic | Cryptography and Security Artificial Intelligence |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2511.13319 |