Game-theoretic Decentralized Coordination for Airspace Sector Overload Mitigation
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arXiv
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| Autores principales: | , , , |
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| Formato: | Preprint |
| Publicado: |
2025
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| _version_ | 1866914161744674816 |
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| author | Im, Jaehan Delahaye, Daniel Fridovich-Keil, David Topcu, Ufuk |
| author_facet | Im, Jaehan Delahaye, Daniel Fridovich-Keil, David Topcu, Ufuk |
| contents | Decentralized air traffic management systems offer a scalable alternative to centralized control, but often assume high levels of cooperation. In practice, such assumptions frequently break down since airspace sectors operate independently and prioritize local objectives. We address the problem of sector overload in decentralized air traffic management by proposing a mechanism that models self-interested behaviors based on best response dynamics. Each sector adjusts the departure times of flights under its control to reduce its own congestion, without any shared decision making. A tunable cooperativeness factor models the degree to which each sector is willing to reduce overload in other sectors. We prove that the proposed mechanism satisfies a potential game structure, ensuring that best response dynamics converge to a pure Nash equilibrium, under a mild restriction. In addition, we identify a sufficient condition under which an overload-free solution corresponds to a global minimizer of the potential function. Numerical experiments using 24 hours of European flight data demonstrate that the proposed algorithm substantially reduces overload even with only minimal cooperation between sectors, while maintaining scalability and matching the solution quality of centralized solvers. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2511_13770 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Game-theoretic Decentralized Coordination for Airspace Sector Overload Mitigation Im, Jaehan Delahaye, Daniel Fridovich-Keil, David Topcu, Ufuk Systems and Control Computer Science and Game Theory Multiagent Systems Optimization and Control Decentralized air traffic management systems offer a scalable alternative to centralized control, but often assume high levels of cooperation. In practice, such assumptions frequently break down since airspace sectors operate independently and prioritize local objectives. We address the problem of sector overload in decentralized air traffic management by proposing a mechanism that models self-interested behaviors based on best response dynamics. Each sector adjusts the departure times of flights under its control to reduce its own congestion, without any shared decision making. A tunable cooperativeness factor models the degree to which each sector is willing to reduce overload in other sectors. We prove that the proposed mechanism satisfies a potential game structure, ensuring that best response dynamics converge to a pure Nash equilibrium, under a mild restriction. In addition, we identify a sufficient condition under which an overload-free solution corresponds to a global minimizer of the potential function. Numerical experiments using 24 hours of European flight data demonstrate that the proposed algorithm substantially reduces overload even with only minimal cooperation between sectors, while maintaining scalability and matching the solution quality of centralized solvers. |
| title | Game-theoretic Decentralized Coordination for Airspace Sector Overload Mitigation |
| topic | Systems and Control Computer Science and Game Theory Multiagent Systems Optimization and Control |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2511.13770 |